|
A |
t the turn of the twentieth
century, all the worldÕs eyes were on China. Western economic expansionism had
pressured ChinaÕs long-held traditions, but some Chinese fought back, with deadly
effects.[1] Starting in June, 1900 the Boxer movement waged war on
foreigners across the northern China countryside and the capital in
Beijing. The rebels slaughtered an
estimated 32,000 Chinese Christians, along with over 230 American missionaries and
their families.[2]
Without an eight-nation allied
military effort, which included the United States, the Boxer Rebellion may not
have been suppressed. Yet the
American involvement in putting down the insurrection might have been
miniscule, if not actually non-existent, were it not for the actions of
American missionaries in China. It
was the continuous and frequent communications of the missionaries to the
American government that put enough pressure on the United States to intervene.
Three major factors explain how
the missionaries applied enough pressure on the United States government to get
it involved in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. The first was how the missionaries explained the atrocities
of the Boxer Rebellion and what the situation was like in China through their
communications to the United States government and the press. One example of how
missionariesÕ information was useful appears in a document from the Chinese
Imperial Foreign Ministry, or Zongli Yamen, to American Minister Edwin
Hurd Conger dated April 2, 1900.
In this document one could clearly see that Conger used the
communications that the missionaries sent whenever he met with, or wrote, the Zongli
Yamen. This particular communication dealt
with the missionaries informing both the Chinese government and Minister Conger
that imperial proclamations were not widely posted like instructed and also
listed several villages where Boxers were Òtraining.Ó Through these types of informative communications one could
truly see how involved the missionaries were involved in the Boxer Rebellion.[3] As Clive Bingham, the attachŽ to
the British legation in Peking (Beijing), noted, ÒThe Ômissionaries were
the best sources of intelligence [and] the only foreigners [who were] really at
all in touch with Chinese native feeling.ÕÓ[4]
On the whole, the missionaries
were a complex lot. Most seemed to
have been motivated by three reasons to become missionaries:
1) Ófollow ChristÕs Great CommissionÓ (spread the religion)[5]
2) ÒChristianity and CivilizationÓ
(modernize backwards societies)[6]
3) the sheer attraction that
Americans have for exotic civilizations like China.[7]
Those who became missionaries and
went to China were only supposed to teach the Bible, although some missionaries
also taught modern science and the knowledge of the day to their Chinese
converts. These missionaries also
had the help of medical missionaries or assistants, who in a way spread
American culture and civilization through their medical practices and beliefs.[8] Historian Warren Cohen has recognized the importance role of
missionaries right from the first treaty the United States made with China in
1844. He has noted that the
missionaries proved extremely important both in relaying information to
American diplomats and acting as interpreters, especially in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. Cohen
contends that the missionaries were Òprobably the major influence on American
attitudes and policy toward China for more than a hundred years.Ó[9] Historians like Diana Preston, on the other hand, hold a
more negative view of the missionaries and their involvement in China. Preston wrote that missionaries were
Òoften ignorant, dismissive, or contemptuous of the native culture, they and
their aggressive proselytizing threatened the very fabric of Chinese family and
village life.Ó[10] Other authors also claim that missionaries gave shelter to
known bandits as long as they became Christian, a charge backed up by an
imperial decree issued in June 1900, which does not blame the missionaries for
sheltering the bandits.[11]
Another negative aspect of the
missionariesÕ presence in China was that the Chinese government and many of its
officials believed that the missionariesÕ work was undermining the
authorities. This was partly because
several missionaries advocated increased American interests in the country.[12] Others took
issue with the missionariesÕ perceived Òmilitant Evangelicalism,Ó that idea of the spread of Christianity
involved Òthe occupancy of heathendom by Christian world-powers.Ó[13] The missionaries found themselves trapped demanding
retaliation for oppression and the consequences of the European opening of
China. Selfish ideas like
retaliation might result in ChinaÕs demise, but guaranteed missions would gain
protection from the various imperial powersÕ spheres of influence. In the end the editor of the Chinese
Recorder put the
whole idea in perspective: Westerners could offer both Christianity and
commerce by right but could not force these things on the Chinese people.[14]
A series of events that led to the
Boxer Rebellion reveal how the missionaries pressured the United States into
action. By the time of the
rebellion from 1899-1901, the United States had longstanding interests and trade
in China.[15] The American Board, a missionary group based in New England
established in 1810, by 1860, had around forty-six ordained missionaries, four
male assistants or physicians, and forty-nine wives or female assistants in
China alone.[16] The period from 1812 to 1860 also saw the United States sign
its first treaty with China on July 3, 1844. Throughout the negotiations American missionaries helped out
tremendously by interpreting Chinese and bridging the cultural gap for the
American diplomats.[17] In 1858 missionaries gained the right to enter ChinaÕs
interior and diplomats could reside in Beijing, the result of the Treaties of
Tianjin that France and England forced on China.[18]
After the American Civil War ended
in 1865, missionary efforts in China greatly increased. Four groups dominated these foreign
mission efforts: Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal churches and the American
Baptist Mission Union. These missionary
groups planned to convert natives, help them establish schools, make the
convertsÕ communities self-contained, and then the missionairies would leave.[19] But anti-Christian violence soon
grew. 1864 witnessed the earliest
incident of attacks on missionaries and native Christians when a mob attacked
Methodists in Fuzhou.[20] In Tianjin, on June 19, 1870, rumors spread that Catholic
nuns were buying orphans and were
using the blood of Chinese infants in medicines and rituals. A mob gathered when the French consul
forced his way into the local yamen and apparently ordered his guards to
fire on the magistrate. The rioters killed the consul and
his advisor, along with twenty-one other foreigners and from thirty to forty
Chinese converts, and destroyed the Cathedral.[21] In 1878, a mob in Fuzhou destroyed an English mission
building after an argument over land with the missionaries there.[22] Following a violent trend, three
Catholics were killed near Beijing, 1891.
Those three deaths led to riots around the city. The situation grew so bad that the
Imperial court issued an edict blaming the incident on outlaws.[23] That did not explain why eleven British
citizens died in anti-Christian riots at Fuzhou in August 1895.[24]
In the mid-1890s the Boxers had
formed as a spiritual group in part opposed EuropeansÕ attempts to push their
ideals and products (opium, cotton, goods, etc.) on the Chinese people. Governments and businessmen wanted
railroads that they, not the Chinese, operated and controlled. They sought to Christianize the Chinese
through the missionaries, to mine
the lands for ores and coal, and to institute the widespread use of modern
technologies like the telegraph.[25] The second, and more localized,
origin of the Boxers came from two sects that arose in Shandong province in the
1890s. 
Boxers called Òthemselves the I
Ho Tuan, or
Boxers United in Righteousness.Ó[26] These Boxers believed that they could become invincible and
summon spirit soldiers. The first
society from which the Boxers emerged was the Big Sword Society that emerged
after the first Sino-Japanese War. This very ritualistic group used vigilantism
in the protection of Chinese property and lives. The second group were the so-called Spirit Boxers. This group exercised martial arts in
the open air during which they experienced mass spirit possession or trances.
Spirit Boxer culture also relied on the use of charms and spells. Like the Boxers, these two groups grew
without organization or real formal leaders and somehow spread very quickly.[27] Spreading like wildfire by the end of the decade, the Boxers
focused on the missionaries as the source of their problems, in part because
the missionaries separated themselves from other foreigners: merchants, because
of their greed, and diplomats,
whom the missionaries believed were borderline hedonists. The missionaries soon became outcasts
to their Western peers, who called them moralists and complainers, and this
made them easy targets for the disgruntled Chinese in the Northern provinces.[28] The missionaries also produced mixed feelings in the
provinces because, while they challenged the traditional ideas in China
(superstitions, gentry and class rule, and rights of people), in its place the
missionaries offered legal protection, goods, and food.[29]
The pitched Battle of Sen Luo Temple between a group of
Boxers and the Chinese army at the small village of Li Lien Yuan in Shandong
province in October 1899 marked the true beginning of American missionary
pressure.
October 1899 is also a critical date to assess the rebellion in
terms of the Chinese governmentÕs policy towards the Boxers. In this month the faction within the
Boxers opposed to the ruling dynasty was destroyed, perhaps even at the Battle
of Sen Luo Temple. After
this point the Chinese government took a more lenient stance against the Boxers
because the Boxers wanted to preserve the Manchu dynasty.[30] The battle that Foreign Minister to China Conger wrote
about in a communication to Secretary of State John Hay occurred on October 18,
1899. The missionaries
around ChÕih Ping, in Shandong province, had received threats on their missions
and converts and requested the aid of the Chinese military. The battle was fought between the
Boxers and Chinese military and around 50 Boxers were killed in the conflict. The governor, Yu Hsien, brought the
Chinese commander from the battle up on disputable charges.[31] Because of this the Boxers gained confidence. From the end of October to early
December, Conger was in constant contact with the Zongli Yamen (the Foreign Ministry), several
times demanding the Chinese Government suppress the movement. In the earliest parts of the conflicts
the missionaries just requested aid from the United States.[32] The missionaries also wanted to publicize their views
through interviews and petitions to the American government.[33] At this point the missionaries had to have asked themselves
Ò[H]ow far could [they] rely for support on their government, which
itselfÉrecognized no establishment of religion? Could their words, as well as themselves, expect protection
against local intolerance and opposition?Ó[34]
While searching for an answer
inside themselves, the missionaries told foreign minister Conger tales of
converts being robbed and the missions being threatened. Conger received disturbing news from
the missionaries that the Boxers had continued to threaten their missions. Not only that, the missionaries 
said that the Boxers were
exhorting money and damaging the property and person of their converts. From this episode one could see that
the missionaries were a main source of information for the ministers who were
only allowed to be in Beijing. The
missionaries passed on news of trouble to Conger who brought it to the
attention of the Zongli Yamen. This in
turn led to the Chinese military getting involved in Shandong.[35] Because of continuous complaints in the province from the
missionaries, Conger was able to push the Chinese government to replace Yu
Hsien with General Yuan Shih-kai as Governor of Shandong. One of these complaints came from a
missionary named of H. P. Perkins.
Writing on November 25, 1899, Perkins noted that the Boxers took the
possessions of many converts while the soldiers did nothing to stop them.[36] Earlier telegrams revealed that Governor Yu Hsien sent
soldiers but gave his officers strict orders not to act. Perkins assessed his situation and that
of his eighteen colleagues in Lin ChÕing and believed that strict orders from
Beijing had to be issued to force action and the rebel leaders had to be
arrested in order to suppress the rebellion. Armed with this information, Conger repeatedly went with to
the Zongli Yamen
to demand action, such as arresting the leaders of the uprising. Because Yu Hsien did not do these
things, he was eventually replaced at the end of December 1899.[37]
Unfortunately the new governor did
not have much time to improve the situation because the inactivity of Yu Hsien
made Shandong a volatile place.
One example of this was a report that came in just after New Year in
1900 that indicated the first foreign fatality of the rebellion, English
missionary Rev. S. M. Brooke. While
the Boxers imprisoned Brooke, Yuan Shih-kai sent soldiers, but they could not
get there in time to prevent his death.[38] With the loss of Brooke and more notes from missionaries in
Shandong, Conger spent a better part of December and early January busy dealing
with the Zongli Yamen. The missionariesÕ
messages led Conger to worry that the Zongli Yamen Òwere moving too slow, and that
there was great danger of the trouble getting beyond their control and of
foreign lives being takenÉ.Ó[39] With the rebellion progressing, a
foreigner killed, and the demands for justice from foreign ministers in
Beijing, the Chinese government issued a strong imperial decree on January
4. The decree talked about
BrookeÕs death and that the Chinese treaties with the foreign powers allow the
missionaries in the provinces. And
by the same token they were to be protected by the Chinese soldiers and
officials who, just before the decree was issued, were lax in acting to help
them, despite previous of imperial decrees.[40] Those involved in the murder were promised to be severely
punished and military officials could be impeached for inactivity.[41]
This strong decree was short
lived, because a new decree came out a week later, January 14, and was Òa
considerable step backward from the decree of the 4th instant.Ó[42] The American minister to China was concerned that the new
decree was secretly encouraging the Boxers, but they decided to wait and see
what would happen.[43] This weaker imperial decree could be argued as a turning point
in the Chinese governmentÕs stance and some historians think this was when some
high-ranking officials started secretly to tosupport the Boxers.
It is also interesting to note that it is around this time that things
were really progressively getting worse in the provinces. The Boxers were gathering in larger
numbers in the villages and there were more instances of threats and attacks on
Christian converts after this point in time.[44]
But, more important for this paper
is another turning point, where the missionaries reached out for help and
support from back in America. Even
with the new governor in place, violence still increased and the missionaries
started to look elsewhere for solutions.
It is hard to say if the missionaries felt that Conger was not doing
enough, not listening to them, or if the situation was getting far enough out
of hand to use their contacts at home to take the issue to the State
Department. Preston argues that
diplomats seemed to disregard missionary reports as insignificant. She went on to say that diplomats held
missionaries responsible for the unrest because of Òtheir high-handed methods,Ó
and even went far enough to say the missionaries were crying wolf. [45] With this disagreement in activity between missionaries and
diplomats in China we do know that over the next several months Secretary of
State John Hay received notes and interviews with Judson Smith, foreign
secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (American
Board for short), concerning the interests and situation of the missionaries in
China.[46]
The American Board was perhaps the
most influential missionary group in the United States. In a couple of letters that Judson
Smith wrote to Hay one finds that the American Board contains several hundred
thousand members and constituents that wanted to see the safety of their
friends and comrades ensured. This
group was important to the missionaries because they knew the American Board
could apply pressure to help their cause.
The American BoardÕs membership was certainly large enough to intimidate
those who sought re-election to listen to its voice.[47]
On January 18, 1900, Hay forwarded
a letter from Judson Smith to Conger that requested the State Department to do
what was necessary to protect the missionaries. SmithÕs letter described a communication he received from a
missionary in China, Dr. Arthur Smith, which was also enclosed in the January
18 document. ÒDr. Arthur Smith, an
American missionary [is] acknowledged as one of the greatest authorities on
China and the Chinese then living[.]Ó[48] Dr. Smith shared his concern for three groups of
missionaries spread out in Shandong, noting that, while the governor of that
province had troops, he feared that they were working with the Boxers. Judson Smith suggested that Hay should
send extra instructions to Conger on how to handle the situation and protect
the American citizens in China. He
also suggested that the United States work with other foreign powers to act as
a cohesive group diplomatically to force the Chinese to suppress the
rebellion. This letter from Judson
Smith showed exactly how the missionaries got the United States government more
involved in the situation. By
writing to a missionary sponsor group at home, the missionaries made more people
aware of their dire situation, sympathize with them, and listen to what they
thought should be done. With this
kind of support from such a group it is not a great leap to say that the
missionaries asked for the American BoardÕs help in looking out for their own
safety.[49]
By the end of January, Conger
could see that the situation was not getting better. He even felt that the decree of January 11 was indeed
encouraging the Boxers because they were increasing in seriousness and numbers
very rapidly.[50] Conger went on to say that Yu Hsien, the former Governor of
Shandong, was being rewarded with a meeting with the emperor despite his wrong
doings. Conger took action nine
days after he read the advice from Judson Smith and the missionaries that urged
that Conger should work in a united front with the other foreign
ministers. And after hearing that
his colleagues (French, German, and British) had received several messages from
missionaries about increased problems in the provinces and the four ministers
decided to hold a conference together.
In this conference they decided to write identical notes to the Zongli
Yamen demanding
that action be taken to stop the Boxers.[51] The foreign ministers wanted the Zongli Yamen to write a strong decree against
the Boxers in support of suppressing them and to state that it is a crime to
help or be a Boxer.
These identical notes also cited missionary claims that the Boxers
pillaged and robbed convertsÕ houses and destroyed their property, such as
chapels. They also claimed that
the BoxersÕ banners said ÒExterminate the foreigners.Ó[52] Identical notes with these messages from the ministers
were issued on January 27, 1900.
CongerÕs action of writing an identical note with his colleagues showed
that the missionaries had influenced his decision and activity.[53]
Even with the missionariesÕ
increased influence through the support of the American Board, and
communications of the devastation in the provinces, especially in Shandong, the
American government was not ready yet to fully support the missionaries and
become involved in the conflict with the Boxers. While China wanted to protect itself from foreigners, the
United States did not like the anti-foreign and aggressive attitude of the
Boxers and some Chinese officials.
The American government also did not want to see China divided. What is interesting is that neither
Conger nor Hay wanted to state that foreigners were in any sort of danger.[54] On February 1, 1900 Hay wrote to Conger stating, Ò[W]hile
American citizens may be exposed to danger, they do not seem so far to have
suffered either in their persons or property.Ó[55] Instead of insisting on the use of stronger demands with the
Zongli Yamen,
he told Conger to request copies of the Zongli YamenÕs communications with ShandongÕs
Governor to ensure the Chinese authorities were doing what was currently asked
of them[56]. This mild, at best, approach by the United StatesÕ
government cost several lives in the end when the rebellion broke out in full
scale only a few months from when this message was sent. If only the State Department had heeded
missionariesÕ words and warnings more seriously, the crisis might have been
contained with much less loss of life.
That same month, February, Dr. Arthur
Smith warned the American legation in Beijing of the dangerous situation in
Northern China, but his alarms fell on deaf ears. Conger, tired of complaints, began to view the missionaries as people who
actively listened to Chinese converts, who started trouble and told far-fetched
tales.[57] Dr. SmithÕs letter did reach the American Board, who
forwarded his letter and recommendation to send warships to the coast in an
attempt to guarantee AmericansÕ safety to the Secretary of State on February 20. In his letter to Hay, Judson Smith
stated that he was happy to report that Conger was doing his job well in his
attempts to get the rebellion put down by the Chinese government. In conjunction with CongerÕs work, the
suggestion that United States should supply some warships off the Chinese coast
was brought up in both Dr. Arthur SmithÕs letter and Judson SmithÕs
correspondence with Hay. Although
Dr. SmithÕs letter was dated mid-December, its contents remained true for the
situation in February. ShandongÕs
new governor, Yuan Shih-kai, had worked to improve the situation, but the
effort he had to undertaken was massive.
Boxers now openly gathered and trained. They threatened the lives and possessions of the Chinese
Christians, demanding that the latter pay high fees. The Boxers were also destroying chapels and threatening
missions.[58]
As the end of February rolled
around, missionaries of the American Presbyterian mission in Chefoo (modern day
Yantai) shared another concern with Conger; they feared the
actions of other foreigners it would adversely affect them. At this time Shandong was in the German
sphere of influence, and the
Germans were building railroads and mines in the province.[59] The missionaries knew that the Chinese population of the
province despised these new technologies for several reasons.[60] As a consequence of this German expansion in the province,
the Americans living there believed their lives were in danger. Rioters attacked the Germans
constructing the railroads and mines, and the Germans then retaliated against
the locals. The missionaries
claimed that the Boxers could not and did not distinguish the nationalities of
the foreigners, and thus the German presence compromised the safety of the harmless
missionaries. This was a very real
concern for the missionaries and one with which the State Department eventually
dealt. For the rest of the Boxer
Rebellion the missionaries had to tread lightly to avoid the wrath of the
Boxers, who were potentially angered by a completely separate group of people.[61]
Without an answer to the situation
dealing with the Germans on top of the spread of rebellion the foreign
ministers decided to write a second series of identical notes, on March 9, to
the Zongli Yamen.[62] The ministers, like the missionaries, believed that this
display of unity would show that the foreign powers meant business and that
their demands would have to be met.
And should this display of unity not work, then each of the ministers,
including Conger, would request two to three warships each be brought by their
representative nations to Northern ChinaÕs coastline for a demonstration of the
foreign powersÕ strength and commitment to stopping the rebellion. Here again another missionary
suggestion was adopted by Conger.
Not only did he work with his foreign colleagues in a united front, but
he also requested warships to intimidate the Chinese, a practice commonly
called ÒGunboat Diplomacy.Ó To be
sure these actions occurred a couple of months after they were suggested, but
perhaps the ideas had to seep in before they could be used.[63]
On March 15 good news finally
arrived for the desperate missionaries.
Secretary of State Hay contacted the Navy Department to request the use
of a ship if needed in China. Hay
wrote that this ship was to be used independently, not in conjunction with the
other foreign powers, to protect American citizens in danger. So it was a small victory or concession
for Conger and the missionaries.
The missionaries and Conger wanted two to three ships for protection and
intimidation, but they only received one.
Hay had also stated that the boat was for protection if absolutely
necessary. So the missionaries and
Conger could not use this one vessel, the gunboat USS Wheeling, to intimidate and force the
Chinese government to protect American citizens and their Christian converts as
United StatesÕ treaties with China stipulated.[64] Alas, this was not to be, and they had to gladly take what
they could obtain from their own heavily occupied government.[65]
This concession from Hay came with
a price. While Hay supported
CongerÕs demands of the Zongli Yamen, he did not agree with CongerÕs method. The Secretary of
State believed that Conger should go to the Zongli Yamen on his own, even if he had made
similar demands as had his European colleagues.[66] Hay was a cautious man who did not want America dragged into
any conflict because of attachment to other foreign powers. If the United States was to be
involved, Hay wanted to do it in his terms and in his way.[67] HayÕs ideas ran counter to those of Conger and the
missionaries, who were more aggressive and who saw that the only way to
suppress the rebellion was by
force, either by a naval demonstration on the coast or the eventual use of
troops. Hay did stress that the
situation must be resolved and that Conger may have to demand the Chinese
government take more stringent, or even radical, to suppress the rebellion.[68]
In late March the American Board
again forwarded information on the Shandong situation to the Secretary of
State. This time Judson Smith received letters from Dr. Arthur Smith and a
second missionary, Henry D. Porter.
These two missionaries wrote about the dire situation in China, saying things seemed to have
stabilized; It was not worse, but did not look like it would improve
either. The two missionaries
feared that if the government, through Conger, failed to take a strong stand in
forcing the Chinese government to use of its own soldiers, the situation would
become so bad that the United States would have to act. On behalf of the missionaries, Judson
Smith wanted to know what else the United States government was doing both to
resolve the situation and to protect American citizens in China. Smith again suggested that a
Òdemonstration of powerÓ might be needed to coerce the Chinese government to
act moving in acting on its treaty obligations.[69] SmithÕs letter caused Hay to
respond and then to forward both communications to Conger. Hay wrote that the Navy was sending a
vessel to the fortified port of Taku, in Northern China. He added that the Germans, had
offered to use their military to protect the American missionaries in Shandong
whenever the missionaries requested it.
This document is significant because it indicates that the United States
was recognizing that the situation was beyond dire and that something had to be
done to protect its citizens, who had been warning of the crisis at hand for
the previous five months. Out of
this communication, the missionaries began to obtain the assistance they had
long requested.[70]
By April 12, the situation in
China seemed to have improved somewhat.
The proclamation by the Governor of Shandong made in March had a good
effect, up to a point. BrookeÕs murderers were tried, and some officials in the
provinces were replaced. The
warships had arrived by this point and Conger believed that too played a part
in slightly improving the situation.
He also thought that the need for an imperial decree to be published in
the Pekin Gazette
was now unnecessary, but that keeping a warship in Northern China remained
essential.[71] After the foreign powers dropped the issue of a decree in
the Pekin Gazette,
the Governor of Zhili (Hebei) did post one in the Gazette on April 16, so in the end Conger
got his way.[72]
While things seem slowly to
improve, it was really just the calm before the storm. Conger mentioned in an April 19, 1900
document that the Chinese government had started to realize its weakness and
was trying to do anything possible to prevent other groups from rebelling. Such groups included the local
volunteers and training groups that had legally gathered in villages since time
immemorial. So in the middle of
April, the Pekin Gazette published an Imperial Decree explaining to these legal groups that
they were not included in the generalized statements against the Boxers but
also warning them not to cause trouble.[73]
But it was not just the legal
training groups about which the Chinese government had to worry. In early May, Conger in a letter to Hay
mentioned an instance of missionaries in Ling Ching, Shandong, killing several
Boxers for prior offenses. This
missionary retaliation caused Conger to rethink his view of them. Regarding the information he had been
receiving from the missionaries, he now wrote, ÒThe reports of the missionaries
are necessarily based on information which they receive from their excited,
frightened, and ignorant converts, who generally believe that they can of right
call upon the missionaries in every case of trouble of whatever sort, and are
continuously expecting and clamoring for foreign protection. On the other hand,
the Zongli Yamen
always has its side of the case made up by officials trying to exculpate
themselves, and are not always careful about the truth. In no case as yet have the ÔBoxersÕ
attacked any American mission or disturbed any property in the towns or
villages where they are stationedÉ.Ó[74]
In this way, the missionariesÕ
actions hurt themselves. Their
retaliation made them seem a lot less like victims and more as aggressors. Regardless, Conger knew he was
obligated to ensure that the Chinese government carried out the stipulations of
its treaties with the United States.
Conger continued to believe that, if the Chinese did what the treaties
required said, it would benefit both countries.[75]
CongerÕs letter goes on to
describe the spread of rebellion to Zhili province, north of Shandong. Information from missionaries there
indicated that most new recruits were teenage boys, who had to pay Òan initiation
feeÓ to a teacher.[76] These men, who were likely jobless, met and trained in
villages throughout the region.[77] They learned incantations and acrobatic moves that they
believed made them invulnerable to weapons. With this spread of the BoxersÕ influence, there were more
conflicts, including two within seventy-five miles of Beijing between
missionaries and soldiers against Boxers, in which the Boxers lost about
seventy men.[78] The danger was also hitting closer to home, for Conger
mentioned some violence in Beijing and he had himself sighted some anti-foreign
placards and books. Conger passed
word of these happenings on to the Zongli Yamen to deal with.[79]
By the middle of May the situation
was critical and the rebellion seemed to get closer daily to the capital. The
situation grew so bad that Conger requested a warship be dispatched to Taku to
replace the Wheeling, which left over a month ago for Shanghai. On May 18 Conger wrote Rear Admiral Kempff detailing some of
the more recent attacks on missionaries and foreigners. A Christian village, fifty miles from
Beijing, was burned down and sixty-one native Christians killed. The Boxers also torched a chapel at a
British mission. Within days of
this communication a new ship, the USS Newark, headed for Taku.
The rebellion had now inched forward to forty miles from the capital,
where another village was burned and more Chinese Christians were killed. Without information from the
missionaries, the legations might not have known of the imminent danger
spreading to Beijing.[80]
American missionary Charles Killie
wrote Conger, notifying him of places around Beijing that were in rebellion.[81]. He listed thirteen villages that were surrounded by large
groups of Boxers and what properties Americans owned in those villages.[82] In some of these places Killie said he saw the Boxers
practice in front of the missions.
These Boxers made open threats on the lives of the missionaries and
their converts. Killie went on to
say that this happened daily by May 16.
He thought that the uprising had spread so rapidly because of a long
drought and rumors such as those claiming the Christians were poisoning the
wells. The missionary mentioned
that, based on his ten years of experience in China, that the situation was
growing worse daily and that the government had absolutely no time to spare in
suppressing the rebellion.[83]
Using the information from Killie,
Conger wrote to Hay on May 21 that the Boxers were now in, and around, the
capital. Conger notified the
Zongli Yamen
that missionaries and reporters were now spreading tales of the horrendous
situation in China to the United States and Europe. By disseminating the news to a greater public the
missionaries were able to obtain more support to aid them. Conger used this message to say that
unless the Chinese government could resolve the situation the American
government would have to keep its citizens happy by sending in Marines to
protect the Americans in China.[84]
Within a couple of days the State
Department notified Conger that guards could sent to protect the American legation
if needed. It took only two days
for Conger considered the crisis an open rebellion and to request the guards.
The Chinese governmentÕs soldiers would not act, and the Boxers were gaining in
strength at an exponential rate.
They burned bridges and stations of the foreign built railroads. By June 1 a coalition of 350 guards
arrived in Beijing.[85] Conger believed that the guards had a good effect in
Beijing. The missionaries and
their converts thought themselves much safer and the discontent in the city
seemed to lessen.[86] It did not last.
Two days later, June 3, the Boxers went back to murdering Christians and
stopping the railroads. On the 4,
Conger sent a letter to John Hay that foreigners were now being attacked and
that another British missionary was killed. The Boxers were still growing and many in the Chinese
military supported the Boxers and, in CongerÕs opinion, might join them. Conger also believed that the Chinese
government was doomed no matter what happened. If it went against the Boxers, the government might face a
large-scale rebellion against the Manchu dynasty itself. Yet, if the government sided with the
Boxers against the foreigners, it faced attack from the foreign powers seeking
to protect their interests. In
less than two weeks the decision was made.[87]
Between June 4 and the time the
Americans militarily intervened in the rebellion, several things happened. On June 5, Conger wrote to John Hay
flatly stating the need for more American warships at Taku. A day later, June 6, Hay wrote Conger
that Ò[i]n concert with naval authorities you are authorized to take all
measures which may be practicable and discreet for protection of legation and
American interests generally.Ó[88] HayÕs action marks the point when
the United States government fully realized that it had to be involved in
suppressing the rebellion. The
only question now was, ÒWhen would intervention occur?Ó[89]
A few days after this letter Hay
again wrote Conger and gave him slightly more cautious orders concerning the eventual
intervention. On June 8, the
Secretary of State advised Conger to work independently from his colleagues
whenever possible. He also
expressed the strong desire for Conger not to engage himself in alliances with
his European colleagues. Again, Hay
wanted to act independently in order to prevent the United States from being
forced to act in a way that it might later regret.[90] From HayÕs standpoint, it was possible to assume that if the
United States entered into alliances with some, or all, of the other powers
that intervened in China that these powers would overthrow the Manchu dynasty
and thus China would be divided up by Òconquerors.Ó Also, if the Americans engaged in their activity too closely
to some of the foreign powers, like the German Empire or Japan, they may be
blamed for outrages committed against the Chinese people, both Boxer and
innocent bystander.
In response to HayÕs message,
Conger sent two telegrams the same day describing the situation in the
China. He stated that the Boxers
were destroying even more railroads and that it was basically up to foreign
soldiers to protect those railroads because Conger believed that the Chinese
government was getting weaker by the minute. Conger also noted that of the twenty-five warships at Taku, only
one was American. This suggested
to Conger and the missionaries that the United States was not giving enough
support for their protection compared to the other foreign powers.[91]
In the second telegram Conger requested
the State DepartmentÕs permission to join his European colleagues in Òdemanding
an audience with [the] Emperor.Ó[92] In this meeting the foreign powers would demand that the
Boxer insurrection be put down immediately and that their countriesÕ respective
militaries would do the task if the Chinese government was not up to it.[93] On June 11 Conger wrote Hay to update the events since June
6: The Boxers essentially ruled
the area outside of Beijing; the railroads were all but lost; chapels were
being burnt; and missionaries said that at least forty of their converts had
been killed in the few days prior to this update. On June 10, Conger had learned from a missionary that the
rebels had torched the American BoardÕs mission college at Tongzhou was burned
down along with all of the missionariesÕ homes and possessions. By this point, all the foreign
buildings outside of BeijingÕs walls had already been burned.[94]
Conger wrote Hay that the four
missions in Beijing had requested guards for each of their compounds, but
Conger believed that there were not enough soldiers to go around. Instead, Conger suggested that all of
the missionaries and their families should gather in one mission compound. If they did this, which the
missionaries in fact did do, Conger could send some guards for their
protection.
[95] 
The group of seventy Americans,
fifty-one of whom were women and children, were protected at this missionary
compound by twenty Marines and some extra guns the missionaries got for
themselves. The American legations
were also protected by a group of thirty-five Marines.[96] On June 10 another 490 guards[97] traveled toward Beijing by train,
the rail lines having to be opened up, to bring more protection into the
city. Conger wrote that telegraph
lines were cut off, and he had heard no word from the soldiers that he and
other diplomats requested. This of
course was not good news for Conger, but that was not the worst of it. Towards the end of the letter he stated
that Beijing was under siege.[98] At this time the Chinese government tried to desperately
stop the Boxers with two Imperial Decrees published in the Pekin Gazette on June 6 and June 8. These decrees both came off as pathetic
attempts at begging the Boxers simply to go away. Instead of acting as a deterrent, these decrees probably
encouraged the Boxers to act more boldly because it sounded as though no one
was going to force them to stop their mayhem and destruction.[99]
With the Chinese government barely
doing anything to stop the Boxers, the foreign powers took the matter into
their own hands and intervened in the situation. The United States sent 2,500
men in the first wave of attacks, while Britain brought 2,500, Russia 4,000,
and Japan 8,000.[100] The war that ensued did not officially
end until the following fall.
The intervention of the United
States and other foreign powers in the Boxer Rebellion created serious
consequences for the survival of the Manchu dynasty. One consequences came from an Imperial Decree on June 20,
1900 in which the Chinese government declared war on the foreigners.[101] One step towards the Chinese declaring
war was the appointment of four new members of the Zongli Yamen in early June 1900. Conger wrote that all four were well
known for being anti-foreign.[102] This act led a Chinese
defeat at the hands of the allied forces nearly a year after the war officially
broke out. After the warÕs end,
the foreign powers made the Chinese government pay large indemnities, which
weakened the already fragile dynasty.
Within fifteen years of the Boxer Rebellion the Manchu Dynasty ended.
Through their continuous and
frequent communications of the missionaries to the American government before
the breakout of the war, from October 1899 to early June 1900, the missionaries
put enough pressure on the United States to get it involved in suppressing the
Boxer Rebellion. The missionaries
frequently relayed the atrocities occurring in the provinces to the American
diplomats in China and later to supporting groups, such the American Board and
the press. They also made
important recommendations regarding the use of soldiers and warships, and
having the American minister to China work with his European colleagues as a
unified force to coerce the Chinese into action. Without the help of the missionaries, the death toll of
Americans, Chinese Christians, and other foreigners definitely would have been
much greater
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