

|
V |
egetius of Fifth Century Byzantium
is remembered for having remarked, ÒQui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum [He who longs for peace, let him
prepare for war].Ó[1] Byzantium was, consistently throughout its history,
tragically resigned to heed the words of Vegetius to stem the tide of seemingly
endless would-be conquerors attempting to invade Byzantine lands. Emperors of Byzantium found themselves
faced with the prospect of almost continuous warfare that harshly contrasted
with the predominant Western experience of warfare that culminated as,
Òprolonged periods of peace interspersed with brief and intensive violence.Ó[2] This ceaseless effort of defense, however, ultimately proved
too much to be sustainable indefinitely.
With the passing of time, there were simply too many enemies and
corresponding challenges on the EmpireÕs military capacities for production and
invention for the great Byzantine Empire to overcome. While, Ò[t]he last centuries of Byzantium were not the first
to see the Empire faced with mortal dangers and threats of collapse,Ó[3] the Empire had never before been
confronted with an army possessing the technology to breach the great walls of
Constantinople. For Fifteenth
Century Byzantium, survival brought with it new and greater demands that the failing
Empire would be hard-pressed to meet.
Contained in
ByzantiumÕs vast, rich history are stories of inspirational leadership, zealous
faith, military triumph, political intrigue and so much more. The greatest of ByzantiumÕs stories, in
the opinion of this author, can be found at the very end of the EmpireÕs
existence, atop the ancient battlements of Constantinople in the year
1453. During these heroically
tragic days in the late spring of 1453, a struggle of epic proportion played
out between the last citizens of a withering Byzantine state and a Turkish
people determined to secure their destiny as the next formidable, imperial
power in the world. As Byzantine
walls, which had held back the armies of the world successfully for centuries,
came crashing down under the fury of Muslim cannon, it was clear to all that
the world they had known would never be the same. The year 1453 marked a changing of the guard in the
composition of the worldÕs military balance of power as Turkish modernization
proved too much for the traditional advantages that had sustained Byzantium for
so long.
While the passage of
time has erased the once massive ramparts and battlements that dominated the
landscape of the Bosporus as the prominent military asset of this, Ògreat power
and a great civilizing force,Ó[4] the surviving accounts of the
cityÕs fall still contain the power to somehow resurrect the tragic romance and
glory of 1453 and conjure the armies of Constantine XI and Mehmed II to once
again play out the final days of one of the worldÕs greatest Òimperial
systems.Ó[5] In order to properly understand the fall of the Byzantine
Empire, one must examine a variety of concepts and significant events to fully
appreciate the contributing factors that ultimately led to the Turkish
victories in 1453. First, one must
explore the relevant prior history and events throughout Byzantium that
contributed to its state of affairs found in 1453. From exploring the traditional Byzantine strategies of war,
to the capture of Jerusalem in 1099 by the Crusader armies of the West, to the
gradual degradation of the Byzantine systems of economy and military supply,
the exigent factors contributing to the EmpireÕs ultimate collapse are a first,
crucial step to laying out the rationale for a military appraisal of the cityÕs
fall as well as constructing a foundation to understanding this event in an
appropriate context.
Secondly, one must
examine the personalities of the two sideÕs civil and military leaders:
Constantine XI and Mehmed II.
Through a brief analysis of their lives and experiences, one can better
appreciate the methodology and strategy employed by both men during the siege
of Constantinople and ultimately come to understand why both men committed
themselves to the course of action found in the existing records of 1453. Lastly, and most importantly, an
in-depth examination of the military action of both Greek and Turkish forces
will provide an insightful perspective into this truly unique confrontation of
culture and military strategy.
This military examination of the siege of Constantinople in 1453 is
intended to demonstrate the respective roles of culture, technology and
religion in the Turkish and Byzantine armies that fought there as well as
illustrate the authorÕs primary contention that this siege was symbolic of a
transition from the entrenched form of military tradition embodied in
ByzantiumÕs great fixed defenses to the spirit of modern innovation embodied by
the Ottoman TurksÕ powerful siege weapons. With these things in mind, it is to that place, to
Constantinople, that this author will now turn to in an attempt to explore a
truly remarkable event in the history of the world.

Byzantine
Emperor Constantine XI and his Ottoman rival Mehmed II
Byzantium was a culture
built upon the necessity of military supremacy. As historian Guglielmo Cavallo has noted, ÒWar was always a part of the reality of
life in Byzantium, and the soldier a part of the tableau of [that] everyday
life[.]Ó[6] As Byzantine society progressed through time, violent
challenges were made on a variety of fronts that severely impacted this
powerful nation-stateÕs ability to fend off invading armies and inevitably
brought about irreversible conditions that contributed to its ultimate
collapse. ByzantiumÕs security and
overall survival hinged on the maintenance of a well-trained and formidable
military presence. It is,
therefore, critical to detail the series of events that contributed to the
ultimate decline of Byzantine military efficiency and, in essence, cleared a
path for foreign forces to finally assail the last vestigeÕs of the Empire and
defeat the imperial prowess of a military no longer able to hide safely behind
its great stone walls.

The
Walls and Ramparts of Constantinople
The Byzantine military
model, styled very much after the traditional Roman way of fighting, centered
on the principles of discipline and unit cohesion to secure victory.[7] As the Byzantines were Òalways outnumbered [in their wars],Ó[8] their tactics stressed the conservation
of men and materiel to the greatest extent possible in order to lessen the
affects of attrition common in fighting numerically superior forces.[9] With such a determined focus to commit to battles that (1)
could be won and (2) could be won without losses in such an excess as to put
the safety of the Empire in jeopardy, Byzantium maintained a long history of
significant military triumph at a very minimal cost. Perhaps the greatest advantage of the Byzantine stateÕs
constant and successful defense was its possession of the most massive
defensive structure in the known world (to that point) that contributed, time
and again, to a most adept defense of the Empire—the city of
Constantinople. As imposing as
this fortification was, in the traditional military sense, it also was long
thought to be the God-guarded city.
With its thick walls of stone bolstered by the presence of Jesus Christ,
the Holy Virgin Mary and the patron saints of Byzantium, this mighty city
became even more precious to those defending its honor and more dangerous to
those choosing to assail its defenses.
With the cityÕs
massive ramparts acting as a virtually unassailable platform from which the
Byzantine defenders could negate any numerical advantage an opposing force may
have, every assault upon the city by conventional means of the day was turned
aside at horrendous cost. In
August of 717, for example, historian Larry H. Adler recounts that, Ò[p]erhaps 200,000 strong, the
Muslim army besieged the city for a year, but the Byzantine (troops) threw back
all the Muslim assaultsÉ [and] only 30,000 [Muslims]Ésurvived the retreat to
their own territory.Ó[10] Quite simply, every attempt by an enemy force to take Constantinople
by storm met the same catastrophic end.
The cityÕs fortifications simply could not be taken by any conventional
means available to armies of the day and since no machine existed to that point
that was capable of breaching the walls of the city, no hostile army could ever
hope to take it by storm. Since
Byzantine rulers remained forever confident that their capital city (and thus
the Empire itself) could never be conquered, the initial weaknesses of
Byzantium appeared very gradually amidst both its overall ability to supply and
support armies throughout the Empire as its territories receded as well as its
ill-chosen courses of political and military action through the Mid-Fourteenth
century that led to both wasteful losses of men and materiel as well as the
making of very bitter enemies in cultures whom they mistreated.

Map of Constantinople
At the peak of its
imperial power the Byzantine Empire was the greatest in the entire world. The actions of Byzantine rulers between
the Seventh and Twelfth centuries reflect a culture and society relatively secure
in their ultimate ability to ensure their continued survival. It is this same sense of assurance,
however, that would lead to the first significant step toward the EmpireÕs ruin
in 1453. As the Empire faced an
increasing threat of incursion from eastern powers in the modern day Middle
East, the call eventually was made by the Emperor of Byzantium to assemble the
armies of Christendom and forcibly turn back the tide of Muslim armies that
threatened the stability of his dominion.
While the Empire had previously been successful at offsetting various
cultures against each other (and thus not against the Empire itself), in 1099
the Byzantines would solidify their hostile status with the Muslim world
forever.
After Crusader armies
had utilized Constantinople as their gateway into the Holy Land, the
devastation they wrought upon the Muslim world would not be easily forgotten or
forgiven. When Christians entered
the city of Jerusalem in 1099, for example, an anonymous Norman knight
remembered that, ÒÉthe slaughter was so great that our men waded in blood up to
their ankles.Ó[11] Another member of the Crusade, Raymond of Le Puy, observed
that, Ò[n]o one ever saw or heard of such slaughter of pagan people, for
funeral pyres were formed from them like pyramids, and no one knows their
number except God alone.Ó[12] The Crusader forces, by putting the helpless citizens of
Jerusalem to the sword, without distinction or mercy for elderly, women or
children, had unknowingly begun the slippery slope of ByzantiumÕs fall. This act of barbarism, which surely
became vilified throughout the Muslim world, had certainly not endeared the
Islamic people with the Christian world.
The slaughter at Jerusalem in 1099 was a distinct byproduct of a
religious fanaticism that would inaugurate an intense period of violence
between eastern and western cultures.
Since the Muslims could not readily take revenge ms on the far-away
lands of the Britons, the Franks, and others, it is logical to assume that they
might have turned their military efforts to the closest Christian state to
their respective domains and attempt to repay the deeds done to them in
1099. As fate would have it, that
proximal Christian state had served as the launching point for Crusader
excursions into Muslim lands—Byzantium.
As Byzantium and their
Muslim counterparts became increasingly embroiled in bitter conflict with each
other, religion rose as the primary motivating force for soldiers on either
side to take up their sword.
Historians Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser have noted that this,
Òpolitical and territorial rivalryÉ [existed] between them for as long as
religion [was] the defining ideological coinage of [their]Éstruggle.Ó[13] The actions of the First Crusade had hopelessly fused
partisan political ambitions between eastern and western cultures with blindly
fervent, religious overtones. The
once tenuous state of affairs between the Byzantines and their Muslim neighbors
had eroded into divisive hatred and violence. This process of revenge for the events of 1099, however, was
not yet achievable by the Muslim world which still faced the distasteful
prospect of storming ConstantinopleÕs walls through the application of brute
and stubborn strength in the endless waves of their soldiers. With admirable patience, Muslim rulers
would wait until the opportune moment when their enemy was vulnerable and the
cost of victory would not be as immense.
In the larger course of human history, they would not have to wait very
long.
The chronicler
Procopius noted once that he was Òunable to understand why indeed it should be
the will of God to exalt on high the fortunes of a man or a place and then to
cast them down and destroy themÉÓ[14] Procopius, however, did not have the advantage of hindsight,
like that enjoyed by modern historians, to see the subtle chain of events that
lead to a societyÕs collapse. The
seams of weakness and decay throughout Byzantium were so imperceptibly small in
their infancy that it is no surprise that none identified the telltale signs of
pending defeat until it was too late.
To the greatest Empire in the world, what significantly negative outcome
could possibly arise from gaining the animosity of a pagan people who, in their
mind, could never overcome the powerful advantages of the Byzantine military
juggernaut? Any new enemy that
committed themselves to a prolonged war would inevitably end as all the others
had – in ruinous defeat. The
flaw of thinking in Byzantium, at this critical juncture, was that the
entrenched status quo that had assured its superiority for so long was destined to change
rapidly.
Byzantine military
leadership, which had always been, Òfully aware of the relationship between the
allocation and redistribution of resources – soldiers, supplies,
equipment, livestock and so forth – and the ability of the Empire to ward
off hostile military action,Ó[15] would now find themselves on
unsure ground as their supply and production capabilities throughout the Empire
would be severely challenged. One
historian noted that,
[t]he common interests that bound medieval
[societies] togetherÉrequired elaborate measures of defense against any outside
enemiesÉ[and] [a]s a result, the rising incidence of siege warfare generated
new and increasingly difficult demands onÉsociety at large that in time remade
the face of medieval Europe.[16]
It is in failing to
maintain this intricate system of defense that is perhaps the most glaring
contribution to ByzantiumÕs growing vulnerabilities to the outside world.
The Byzantine Empire
was a vast, interconnected network of resource production that fueled its
military. Beginning at the end of
the Eleventh Century, however, this network began to break down and thus
weakened the overall continuity and cohesion of the Byzantine military.[17] After the defeat of Emperor Romanus IV, for example, the
territories subsequently lost deprived the Empire of their primary supplier of
cavalry horses.[18] Now experiencing shortages in the armyÕs primary source of
rapid mobility, the Byzantine militaryÕs ability to respond quickly to threats
along the frontier and field a force effective at fighting Muslim armies of,
Òalmost entirelyÉlight cavalryÓ[19] was severely reduced.
Also contributing to a comprehensive failure of the EmpireÕs system of
defense along its vast borders was its being, in one historians words,
Òcompelled to withdraw their attention from the frontier and focus it on the
countless armies marching in from the WestÉ[in order to satisfy] [t]he need for
reserving troops to fight the Latins should they prove hostileÉÓ[20] Now required to insulate themselves from a potentially
chaotic Christian force marching through the heart of the Empire en route to
the Holy Land, Byzantine emperors and generals simply lacked the ability to
reinforce their border provinces against the press of outside factions throughout
the 1200s.
The traditional
rationale for executing a successful campaign (whether offensive or defensive)
during this period was to field an army with a capability, Òin direct response
toÉ [what] they would have faced[,]Ó[21] and Byzantium, tragically, could
no longer adhere to this long-held principle. Without sufficient forces to properly defend the EmpireÕs
outlying territories, all that was required to claim possession of many of the
EmpireÕs extended provinces was for an outside group to simply resign
themselves to the necessity of the task and commit themselves to battle and the
casualties such confrontations would entail. Unfortunately for Byzantium, this impetus for foreign
nations to press hard on the frontier defenses of the Empire was heightened by
the aggressiveness of the advancing Mongol hordes. As historian Martin Sicker has noted, this Mongol advance,
Òpushed many Turkish tribes against [ByzantiumÕs] permeable frontiers in both
Europe and AsiaÓ [22] and ultimately forced Byzantium
and the Ottoman Turks into an irreversible course of conflict as the two
cultures fought for regional supremacy throughout Asia Minor. Without consciously attempting to, the
Mongol aggression during this period had unwittingly provided the Ottoman
Empire with the opportunity to permanently establish themselves within the
boundaries of the Byzantine Empire and begin their quest to become the
unrivaled power of the entire region.
The Byzantine
frontiers were, at this point, Òin a state of decay and highly vulnerable to
attack.Ó[23] Their Muslim adversaries, ever patient, were now poised to
take full advantage of this temporary lapse in Byzantine military
capabilities. Now, a seemingly
benign lull in imperial defensive capabilities would deepen into a systematically
devastating failure of the EmpireÕs overall military structure. After coming into contact with the weak
resistance offered by Byzantine thematic units on the frontier, the Turks
seized upon this advantage.
Subsequent Turkish assaults would deprive the Empire of its most viable
recruiting areas for infantry and cavalry soldiers and worsen the tactical
situation throughout Byzantium as military ranks grew increasingly sparse and
inexperienced.[24] While a shortage of superior-quality soldiers could be counter-balanced
with an influx of well-trained mercenaries readily available throughout the
Empire, fiscal strain, heightened with each subsequent loss of territory and
its respective taxable population, rendered the Emperor unable to afford and
retain the skilled soldiers-for-hire that had served the Empire in the past and
that were desperately needed in the present.[25] Byzantine military commanders were now forced to accept the
lesser-quality mercenaries that their meager coffers could secure. This further perversion of the standard
of excellence and formidability in Byzantine contingents did very little to
alleviate the worsening crisis. As
historian Charles Diehl noted, ÒLess disciplined, more grasping than ever,
these redoubtable troops were now a greater danger to the Empire than to the
enemy.Ó[26] The great Byzantine juggernaut, it seems, was losing its
once unstoppable momentum.
With critical war
supplies and soldiers diminishing, the most essential ingredient needed to stave
off disaster throughout Byzantium was adept and skillful military
leadership. Fate, however, had
seen fit to rob the Empire of this crucial element of leadership in its darkest
hour. ÒByzantium,Ó wrote Diehl,
Òcould no longer find such men as those of old, whose personal influence had so
strongly impressed the troops under their commandÉ[and now] few if any great
leaders [would be] heard of at the head of imperial armies.Ó[27] Now lacking proper military leadership from the capital as
well as a fundamental shortage in essential military munitions, foodstuffs, tax
revenues and trained/trainable soldiers (compliments of territories lost to the
Ottoman Turks, et al), the Byzantine Empire was ripe for exploitation. In a state of tumultuous uncertainty,
the Empire was weakened further still by the outbreak of a sudden and
devastating series of civil wars brought about by an entity that had once
served to further the aspirations of the Empire—the Crusaders.
In 1204, Crusader forces,
marching to wage war on the Muslims in Asia Minor, successfully stormed the
gates of Constantinople and entered the city without having to lay siege to the
cityÕs formidable defenses. With
the tensions between the Western Christian and Eastern Orthodox peoples
reaching a climax, this event was symbolic of the on-going struggle within the
Christian world. When Crusaders
entered the city with an ease previously unknown in the cityÕs long history,
they unknowingly struck a mortal blow to the teetering Byzantine state. Through the course of sacking the
cityÕs great wealth, the Crusaders also (and more importantly) succeeded in
toppling the already unstable central government there. ÒEuropean nations,Ó remarked historian
Jon Haldon, Òin a bid to assimilate the conquered Byzantines into their
respective dominions, initiated a series of illegitimate [and ineffective]
rulers throughout the empireÕs provinces that marked the beginning of the end
for the Byzantine Empire.Ó[28] Now foreign rulers from the West who had no vested interest
in the EmpireÕs continuity and survival as an independent state compounded a
lack of military leadership. The
following years were a tragic turn for the worse for the Byzantine people as
the rule of pretenders from Europe brought them ever closer to the edge of
disaster. Historian George
Ostrogorsky noted, these internal power struggles throughout the remaining
Byzantine provinces, initiated by the Crusaders, Òbegan a long succession of
civil wars which hastened the internal collapse of the Byzantine Empire. This dynasticÉrivalry inaugurated a
period of severe internal crises which exhausted the Empire and ultimately left
it defenseless against the expansion of the Turks and the Serbs.Ó[29]
As the porous
frontiers of the Empire gave way to a surge of Turkish expansionism to the east
and Serbian unrest to the west, the Byzantine Empire had also succumb to the
rule of outsiders and pretenders to its throne. Devolved into a state unable to mount any semblance of
coordinated defense on behalf of their citizens, Byzantium soon fell prey to
the aggression of its various neighbors.
The signs of impending collapse throughout the remains of Byzantium were
now palpable enough that even Procopius would have had no doubt as to how
Byzantium was falling from greatness.
With each successive failure in its infrastructure and leadership
Byzantium was being broken apart and worn down by its many rivals.
These weaknesses
throughout Byzantium could not have come about at a more inopportune time. At the moment in history where
Byzantium needed to be at its highest moments of strength and cohesion, it was
lost in a chaotic internal struggle with no ability to effectively oppose its
enemies – enemies whose militaries were still gaining strength and
momentum. By the early Fourteenth
Century, the once loosely organized Turkish tribes had reorganized themselves
into an impressive military state that introduced the notion of heavy infantry
(embodied by the ex-Christian Janissary contingent) into the Muslim military structure as
well as the introduction of a variety of specialty and support units that
enabled the Turkish forces to appear on the world scene representing the
cutting edge of military technology and innovation.[30] The Sultan Orhan had, Òalso set up efficient means for
mobilization, so that he could gather together a large and well trained force
at the shortest notice.Ó[31] With new weapons and a professional army, this newly
organized Turkish military quickly subdued most territories along the ÒAsiatic
frontier.Ó[32] The Byzantine Empire, a mere shadow of its former vastness
and glory, was now forced to accept fealty to the Turkish Sultan in 1379.[33] Like a nation whose power was destined to be ceded to a
successor with the necessary balance of power, ambition and promise to thrive,
the Byzantine state slowly began dissolved into the growing Turkish
Empire.
Byzantium, after so
much loss and despair, simply did not have the vitality to withstand and
successfully fend off the ÒRising SultanateÓ[34] of the Ottoman Turks. As Sixth Century Byzantine chronicler
Peter the Patrician remarked, ÒAs long as men are evidently winning over their
adversary, their courage is cultivated.
But when it is obviously failing to destroy their enemies, they waste their
own strength and as a result they lose to those who should not conquer them.Ó[35] While it is a point of historical contention as to whether
or not the Empire would have eventually succumbed to the aggression of the
Turkish forces from the east, the fact remains that a total failure in the
fighting capabilities and spirit throughout Byzantium was a distinct byproduct
of the systematic failures of the civil and military functions of the Empire
from the Twelfth Century onward.
These failures produced a feeble people whom the Turks conquered with
much more ease than they might have otherwise. Byzantium, it seems, was slowly giving in to the internal
and external pressures being applied to it.
The remnants of the
Empire were in a sad state of affairs by the dawn of the 15th
Century. The historian Runciman
observed that the, Òcivil wars had wrecked the economy of [ByzantiumÕs
remaining] districts [and that they] could barely afford the minimal taxes the
emperors demanded.Ó[36] Denied the resources once available in its many lost
territories and suffering from an economic collapse within the EmpireÕs frail
remnants, the future looked unimaginably bleak for Byzantium. The Ottoman Turks had waited to assail
their long-hated enemies until their ability to resist was almost
non-existent. They had utilized
the Byzantine civil wars to Òpermanently establish themselves in EuropeÓ[37] and, as such, posed a significant
obstacle to any reclamation of power or territory by the Byzantines. Though the Byzantine Empire seemed to
be failing, however, a last resurgence of imperial glory was still to
come. As time passed, the yokes of
servitude and supplication to the Christian pretenders and the Turkish
overlords grew unbearably heavy for the Byzantine people to live under. The time for complacency and compliance
was reaching its end throughout the Empire. Byzantium would soon show the world it would not pass
quietly into the night.
Despite the
dilapidated infrastructures of the Empire during this period, a sentiment of
resistance still permeated Byzantine society. This was not a people accustomed to lordship of another
society over itself. As Haldon
notes that, Ò[t]he defenses of the city [Constantinople], although suffering
from lack of maintenance, remained impressive and powerful.Ó[38] Since a besieging force had never successfully stormed this
great city, the Byzantines drew strength from the still palpable power exuded
by their unconquerable city.
Throughout Byzantium, increasingly numerous instances of inspiration and
hope began to reinforce the threads of resistance in the EmpireÕs remaining
populace.[39] The historian Donald Nicol, for example, noted one such
episode: ÒIn August 1402É[t]he
blockade of Constantinople, which had lasted for eight years, was lifted; and
the very fact of the Ottoman defeat and the humiliation of the Sultan [at the
hands of the Mongols] were such unexpected events that Christians
unhesitatingly ascribed them to the intervention of God and his MotherÉ .The
future [of Byzantium, it seemed,] was in GodÕs hand.Ó[40]
As Byzantine
resurgence throughout the remaining imperial territories intensified, the
conflict between Byzantine forces and the temporarily disorganized Ottoman
Turks (who were in the midst of an internal upheaval), religion and religious
intervention became an integral part of Byzantine military strategy. If this faltering nation were to have
any hope in reclaiming their Empire and reconstructing their ability to defend
their homes effectively, their soldiers would have to believe that they were
fighting for a cause that could not be beaten—a cause ordained by
God. With a sudden resurgence of
fighting spirit, Byzantine forces began to successfully reassert their power in
the localized regions surrounding Constantinople. With each new victory for Byzantium, the tempo of the day,
like a mighty orchestra, was violently increasing as it approached the final
and glorious crescendo of the Byzantine EmpireÕs symphony.
The sudden, positive
turn of events throughout Byzantium, with internal division impairing Turkish
military responses to Byzantine reclamation efforts, was fatefully
short-lived. Byzantine military
efforts would serve to reawaken the dormant Turkish nationalism that had
threatened it previously by reminding Turkish leaders of the continued threat
posed by this Christian nation.
For example, an effort on the part of the Byzantines to install a
ÒfriendlyÓ ruler (or Byzantine-sponsored pretender) atop the Turkish throne in
1421 ended with this Byzantine ÒfavoriteÓ[41]
being executed by loyalist elements within the Sultanate. This political farce convinced his
successor (a loyal follower of the unification tendencies of the Sultan Orhan)
of the necessity to finally do away with this cancerous Byzantine society.[42] The enraged Sultan Murad immediately
made preparations to strike the heart of Byzantine resistance and capture the
city that boasted to enjoy the, Òmiraculous intervention of its protectress,
the Mother of God.Ó[43]
The Turkish siege of
1422 was the final lesson of the Sultanate on the necessity of identifying a
new method of breaching the walls of Constantinople without relying on the
traditional doctrine of siege warfare that necessitated a great number of
soldiers to simply overwhelm the fortificationÕs defenders atop the battlements
and, by brute force, make their way into the city via costly hand-to-hand
fighting. ÒMurad,Ó recalled Nicol,
Òemployed every means at his disposal to break the resistance of the
inhabitants and take their city by assaultÉ [but] a long and bitter battle for
possession of the walls [ended in bitter defeat].Ó[44] Repulsed from the cityÕs walls
with horrendous loss, the hopes of Murad dissolved in a sudden and complete
Turkish route.[45] This resounding triumph of Byzantine
spirit now made it perfectly clear that that no numerically superior force
could hope to reduce Constantinople (and Byzantium with it) without first
devising a way to effectively breach the walls preceding a massed infantry
assault. The Turks, however, would
not be deterred from their ultimate objective of taking Byzantium. Although the carnage before the walls
of Constantinople surely caused Turkish leaders to pause at the thought of
storming the Byzantine battlements again, religious inspiration, once again,
would serve as the impetus to continue their efforts no matter the cost.
According to Islamic
tradition, the Prophet Mohammed remarked, ÒHave ye heard of a city of which one
side is land and the two others water?
The Hour of Judgment shall not sound until seventy thousand sons of
Isaac shall capture it.Ó[46] With the words of their iconic founder
urging them on, the Turkish determination to fulfill their destiny and implied
religious obligation and complete the conquest of Byzantium by defeating the
mighty city of Constantinople (which was the prophesied city with one land side and two on
water) grew to unparalleled heights.
As the Turkish military leaders assimilated conquered civilizations into
their army of diverse soldiers, weapons and tactics, the answer to overcoming
ConstantinopleÕs considerable defenses was finally found. As Constantine XI took the throne in
1449[47] and Mehmed II rose to leadership among
the Turks in 1451[48],
the final days of Byzantium had arrived.
These two charismatic leaders would, in short order, find themselves in
opposition amidst the bitter, final struggle for the great city of
Constantinople. This time,
however, the walls of this ÒCity protected by GodÓ[49]
would be tested as never been tested before. Byzantium and their Islamic counterparts looked to their new
leadership for guidance amidst a maelstrom neither culture had ever seen
before. The time for peace had
ended. The age of the cannon had
come.
As the situation
between the expanding Ottomans and the Byzantine Empire worsened, political and
diplomatic efforts on both sides became more and more opposed with any hope of
resolving their respective tensions short of violence. Byzantine Emperor John VIII, for
example, went as far as to sacrifice the traditional status of the Orthodox
Christianity being independent and autonomous from the Christian West (a
feeling in direct opposition with the dominant feelings of the EmpireÕs
populace that insisted upon the supremacy of the Orthodox Church to any other)
by pledging his subservience to the Papacy of Rome in 1439 through a
declaration that reunited the two Christian faiths.[50] It was Emperor John VIIIÕs hope that
this action would prompt Pope Eugene IV to sponsor the formation of a crusade
with the intent of rescuing Byzantium from the growing Ottoman threat. By the time this crusade finally set
out from Eastern Europe in the summer of 1443, however, it was simply a benign
gesture in futility. ÒThe popeÕs [sic] crusade,Ó wrote one historian,
Ògot no further than Varna on the Black Sea coast. There it was annihilated by the Turks under the personal
command of the Sultan Murad.Ó[51] This unbridled act of war by Byzantium,
through their proxy use of yet another Crusader force against the Muslims, more
than enraged the Turkish Sultan.
The cruel memories of the legacy of other Christian crusades were still
very much palpable throughout the Islamic world. This act, instigated by the Byzantine Emperor, left no
question to the Ottoman ruler Murad (and his son Mehmed) that this troublesome
people would have to be dealt with and soon.
The greatest
contribution to the military confrontation witnessed on the battlements of
ByzantiumÕs final refuge was the complete and total commitment of each sideÕs
respective leadership to victory.
Both Constantine XI and Mehmed II possessed the necessary qualities as a
military leader to ensure a confrontation between their respective peoples that
would be nothing short of cataclysmic.
Sultan Mehmed, for example, was described by the existing accounts to
have been a man with singular drive toward the establish of a dominant Ottoman
state and possessing of a commitment to that end that knew no bound. ÒMore cruel than Nero,Ó wrote one
period chronicler, Òhe delights in shedding of blood. He is full of courage, eager to conquer the whole world and
to rule greater empires than any of those who came before himÉÓ[52] Byzantium, in its dilapidated state,
offered the young Sultan a valuable opportunity to demonstrate his dominionÕs
might. This Òraging monsterÓ[53]
who thought himself equal to any previous conqueror of peoples in all of
history[54]
now, for personal and political reasons, resolved himself to the prospect of a
final confrontation with his peopleÕs long-standing rival astride the Bosporus
and Òturned his attention towards the city of ConstantinopleÓ[55]
in a bold attempt to spread Ottoman culture throughout the world. As Mehmed himself maintained in a
letter to the Pope of Rome, Òthe bent of our desires is to enlarge the bounds
of our Empires.Ó[56] With such an expressed desire to expand,
conflict with those in the way of that expansion was almost inevitable.
In light of this
desire to expand the bands of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, however, the
question remains as to what exactly brought about this aggressive nature in the
young sultan that culminated in his great move against Byzantium. Perhaps it was the European impression
of his abilities as a Òlistless young man with very little military or
political talentÓ[57]
and their subsequent calls for the immediate organization of military campaigns
to be carried out throughout Ottoman lands in Anatolia.[58] Also possible was the tenuous internal
situation among Arab states – namely the Mamluk rulerÕs, Òdesire to
remain chummy with the emperor [for social and economic reasons]Ó[59]
which threatened the overall authority of the novice Ottoman sultan among his
fellow Muslim subjects. Mehmed
knew that he could not survive any internal dissent within his people at this
critical juncture in his reign.
The slightest weakness could end in disaster. Whatever the reason, Mehmed was indeed highly motivated to
seek a way to strengthen his grasp on the whole of the Anatolian Peninsula and
ensure his ambitions of power and glory came to fruition. Mehmed moved with the necessity of a
man in danger of losing his power, and through charismatic exhortation, the
Ottoman people rallied to their leaderÕs call to greatness and destiny to begin
the campaigns that would bring the Ottoman armies into direct and violent
contact with their Byzantine neighbors.
Though a brief respite
of hostilities arose between Byzantium and the Ottomans after Sultan MuradÕs
death in 1451,[60] it was not
to last for long. Byzantine
diplomacy, which had never been subtle or tactful when it involved peoples they
viewed as their lesser, now made a critical misstep with the young Turkish
sultan. Thinking him weak and
pliable, and hoping to take a first great step toward reclaiming the prestige
and power of the Byzantium of old, Emperor Constantine XI demanded an increase
in the annual tribute paid by the Sultanate to the Byzantines.[61] While seemingly insignificant, this
demand was taken as a personal declaration of war by the hot-blooded
Mehmed. The response by the
Ottoman ruler, whom some thought to be Òinexorably set upon the destruction of
the Christians,Ó[62] was
explosive – ÒYou stupid GreeksÉI have had enough of your devious
waysÉ[W]e are not children without strength and reasonÉ[A]ll that you will
achieve is to lose what little you have left.Ó[63] Mehmed was finally given the spark to motivate
his desire to aggressively expand his Empire and overrun the remaining
Byzantine territories. This would
be his chance to prove to all of Christendom, as well as disparate factions
amongst his fellow Islamic states, that he was a force not to be under-estimated
or trifled with. As Mehmed himself
remarked that he marched to war, ÒÉnot only for our safety to revenge the
injuries that other men do unto us, but [also to]Émake our enemies to fear us
the more.Ó[64] This was to be the young sultanÕs initial
test of strength and power and it would not be a test he could permit himself
to fail. Any chance at diplomacy
had now suffered its final defeat.
Rage and resentment swept through both societies as war became a cruel
inevitability. To the Byzantine people,
who prescribed to the social imperative that, Òanswer[s] violence with
violence,Ó[65] no
aggression of the Ottomans would be suffered lightly. The desolations of war and the spilling of blood, it seemed,
were to decide the fate of both peoples.
Mehmed acted swiftly
and decisively to deal with these troublesome Byzantines who had offended both
his and his peopleÕs honor. Though
he admitted that, ÒIf [they]Éhad but as much might as will, and as much strength
as valor, I should think [they]Éwere not to be conquered by any whatsoever,Ó[66]
the fact remained that the Ottoman Empire had a number of significant military
advantages over their Byzantine counterparts. Mehmed realized early into his reign that if his dreams of
expansion were to be realized he would have to defeat the Byzantines quickly
and decisively before they could strengthen their somewhat antiquated and
dilapidated military machine to oppose him. Mehmed knew all to well the daunting military history of
foreign peoples against a formidable and prepared Byzantine military
machine. If given time, it was
possible that Byzantium could amass a force capable of slowing or halting his
advances into their domain. This
was not time the young sultan was prepared to give them.
Those who opposed MehmedÕs
chosen course of action for war soon found themselves ousted from positions of
authority as Mehmed rapidly surrounded himself with an advisory council
receptive and agreeable to his desires.[67] Now possessing a leader with the
unbridled desire to commit wholly to a massive assault upon the weakened
Byzantine state (and Constantinople), the Ottoman Turks were still faced with
the imposing obstacle posed by the mighty cityÕs impregnable walls and
battlements. Fate, however, had
seen fit to cede to ByzantiumÕs greatest opponent the technology that would
enable their destruction – the cannon. As historian Roger Crowley noted, ÒFor the first time since
trumpets flattened the walls of Jericho, a significant advantage was handed
back to the side besieging a stoutly fortified [position]. Fifteenth-Century Europe rang to the
roar of great siege guns, the shattering of stone balls against the stone
walls, and the sudden collapse of hitherto impregnable bastions.Ó[68]
With these new and
terrible engines of war, no fixed defensive position in the known world was
safe from the ill-will and hostility of neighbor states in possession of these
new and devastating cannons.
Mehmed, seizing upon this transformational technology with a fervor,
directed his military commanders to, Òquickly [become] proficient in
manufacturing, transporting and firing its artillery [as their army] was second
to none in the deep logistical requirements of gunpowder warfare.Ó[69] Mehmed utilized European mercenaries
proficient in the art of casting these artillery pieces to guide his operation[70]
and, in only a short time, was constructing cannon, Ògreater than any which had
been previously known.Ó[71] Armed with a weapon no army had ever
possessed when confronting the mighty Byzantine city of Constantinople, Mehmed
would need to move quickly to isolate it and its meager population from the
rest of the world before they could organize their forces effectively to oppose
his soldiers. Armed with loyal and
numerous soldiers, Mehmed readied the last weapon of his arsenal for the coming
struggle – religion. Like
the past military leaders of the Ottoman Empire, Mehmed would turn to the
religious fury of the so-called ghazi, or Òsoldiers of holy war,Ó[72]
to propel his cause to victory.[73] With his tools of war prepared and
assembled, Mehmed needed only to fire the hearts of his soldiers to assure the
final victory of his empire over Byzantium.
A prophesy of Mohammed
had foretold of this cityÕs fall and now Mehmed would fuse this seemingly
perfect religious edict into his battle plans to make the confrontation with
Byzantium one of holy necessity and divine decree. Mehmed realized the importance of steeling the nerves of his
soldiers with words that transcended human fear and doubt and infused the power
of the divine with each step his soldiers would take. With the memory of the Crusades reawakened in the minds of
his people by the actions of 1443, MehmedÕs oath that they, Òwould fight the
Greeks bravely and, relying on Allah and his prophet, take the cityÓ[74]
reaffirmed the hatred and bitterness between Islam and Christianity in the
hearts of his men. Mehmed had now
hit upon the perfect formula for achieving his bid for imperial glory – a
weakened enemy, the successful exploitation of technological innovation and the
fusion of religion with militaristic ambition. With the Ottoman host en route to Constantinople, it is now
vital to briefly detail the character and mindset of MehmedÕs military foil in
the pending collision of culture and religion—Emperor Constantine
XI. Unbeknownst to Mehmed it was
the Byzantines who had long ago perfected the fusion of religion with the
defense of their city and Constantine XI was the ideal personality to exhort
these faithful virtues in his people to achieve deeds of moving heroism, the
likes of which had never been seen.

Constantine Palaiologos, the future Emperor Constantine XI
Constantine Palaiologos was born into a Byzantium that appeared as a mere shadow of its former glory. As one historian noted, Ò[t]he great trunk of the tree of Constantinople, where its first seed had been planted, seemed to be hollow and bending in the cold wind blowing from the east.Ó[75] Growing up in a world of chaos and uncertainty, Constantine would develop a personal commitment to the continued survival and protection of his homeland that would resonate in his years as a despot and regional leader of Morea.[76] Seen through the actions of ConstantineÕs life and career leading to his final, desperate stand atop his cityÕs walls in 1453, Constantine was both a man of utter commitment to the Empire