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he United States has, over the
course of its history, made earnest attempts to establish diplomatic relations
with numerous cultures and peoples in regions across the globe. Nowhere has this relationship been more
tenuous or fragile than in the Middle East. Since the founding of the Jewish state of Israel in the wake
of the Second World War, US policymakers have found themselves atop a Òdelicate
tightropeÓ[1] of competing interests in the
region. Israel, a state supported by
AmericaÕs economic and industrial might, quickly found that coexistence with
the multitude of Arab nations that surrounded it would be tenuous at best. As the regional interests of the United
States became more dynamic as a result of the Cold War, US policymakers found
themselves with the arduous task of befriending Arab states that would, they
hoped, insulate the region against Communism while simultaneously maintaining
their standing commitment to aiding Israel. As historians have noted, Ò[t]he problem for the United
States [was] that its two critical national interests in the Middle East
– securing access to oil supplies and securing Israel – [were] at
cross purposes whenever the US allies in the region, Israel and the moderate
Arab states, [were] at odds with each other.Ó[2] In this policy-oriented world of
dŽtente and realpolitik, the United States set out to successfully navigate an intricate and
delicate web of alliances in the Middle East in the hopes of forging powerful
regional bonds that would sustain the country throughout its global contest
with the Soviets. As will be
discussed in detail, the United States successfully pursued diplomatic
relations with both Israel and Saudi Arabia throughout the 1970s in order to
accommodate its dynamic needs as a result of the Cold War.
The first significant
diplomatic venture into the Middle East by the US was its support for a
fledgling and highly vulnerable state in Israel. Wrought with shortfalls and infrastructural inadequacies,
ÒIsrael lack[ed] its own sources of energy, gas and oil supplies that [were]
critical for its developing economy.
ForÉthese reasons, Israel look[ed] to its close US alliance for
strategic and military assistance, as well as for economic assistance that
[was] indispensable for its national security.Ó[3] With the initial foundations for a
diplomatic relationship laid, US and Israeli leaders focused on the concept of
security as the framework for their continued relationship. For American policymakers, Ò[s]trategic
cooperation with IsraelÉprovided the United States with shared intelligence on
Arab terrorism, forward staging of military supplies, shared technological
development of weapon systems, and a like-minded ally upon which the United
States may depend.Ó[4] In the minds of US politicians and
strategists, sustaining this isolated bastion in Israel was necessary as it
represented a foothold into the Mediterranean and Middle East. To a Jewish government whose dominant
memory Òsince its war of independence in 1947-48 [had] been unremitting
hostility punctuated by wars and terrorist attacks,Ó[5]
the prospect of military and economic aid from one of the worldÕs preeminent
superpowers was one that they were not prepared to casually dismiss. Realizing all too well that Ò[t]he
creation of IsraelÉ[had] aroused the deepest animosities of the peoples of the
regionÓ[6]
Israeli policy, from the time of its founding, Òweighted heavily towards a
strategic and military calculusÓ[7]
that set national security as a chief priority of the country.[8]
With the Israeli victory over its
Arab neighbors in 1948, and thus national security assured in the country at
least in the short term, US sales of arms and munitions to the Jewish state was
noticeably restrained.[9] Having
secured the fundamental security of their foothold in the region, US
policymakers demonstrated what would become a recurrent theme in US-Israeli
relations: a willingness to lend aid when needed, but not to overly support the
government there and risk another costly proxy war against the Arab Middle East
or, even more daunting, a direct confrontation with the Soviets. As time passed, however, American hopes
that their inroads into this region would be uncontested by the Soviet
government in Moscow were stifled.
By the beginning of the 1970s, American interests regarding the Middle
East and Israel intensified as the region became yet another focal point for
the broader Cold War. As Lenore G.
Martin noted, the beginning of the 1970s ushered in a new era wherein Òthe
United States began to view Israel as a strategic [military] asset and, from
rearming Israel, was part of a concerted effort to contain Communist expansion
in the Middle East.Ó[10] With Israel now serving as a frontline
effort against the American fight to contain Communism, aid to the country
would no longer be adherent to the same restraints that had existed throughout
the 1950s and 1960s and, correspondingly, the nature of US involvement in the
region would never again be the same.
The demands on the United States would increase many times over as a
once simple issue of aiding a single nation evolved into an elaborate network
of friendships as the scope of US involvement began to expand throughout the
entire region – a frustrating legacy of AmericaÕs stalemate with Communism.
Understanding the
realities faced by the United States as a result of the Cold War is fundamental
to understanding the actions taken by the government during the 1970s and thus
appreciating the evolutionary nature of AmericaÕs increasing involvement in the
Middle East during that period.
Firstly, after World War II ÒAmerica was drawn
into the Middle East by the containment theory, which required opposition to
Soviet expansion in every region, and by the doctrine of collective security,
which encouraged the creation of NATO-like organizations to resist actual or
potential military threats.Ó[11] From the perspective of US
policymakers, the impetus to act in the Middle East by the beginning of the
1970s was necessitated by its adopted policies in previous decades and now it
fell to them to make a convincing case for action to the American people as a
whole – a task that would not be as easy as one might imagine. As noted, ÒAmerican leaders knew that
they had to resist further Soviet expansion. But their national tradition caused them to seek to justify
this resistance on nearly any basis other than as an appeal to the traditional
balance of power.Ó[12] This comprehensive containment of
Communism was a policy-based extension of AmericaÕs global aspirations. As Kissinger noted, however, US
policymakers could not convince the public at large to support a policy that
might necessitate military intervention against Soviet expansion by simply
appealing to the pragmatic Òcalculations of power and the national interestÓ[13]
that were the essential hallmarks of the realpolitik philosophy. Accepting these new demands by the
1970s, American policymakers embraced a new, and more appealing, type of
foreign policy in its Middle Eastern relationships – a policy that
resembled an odd blend of realpolitikÕs strategic calculations and dŽtenteÕs
Òstrategic alternative to overtly militant antagonismÓ[14]
by means of negotiation and dialogue.
With the desired levels of
military calculation and diplomatic earnest in place in Washington, the United
States was left only to measure and accept its own capacities and limitations
in this newest Cold War battlefield.
Politicians such as Nixon or Kissinger surely realized that the American
people would come to accept a policy that demanded that Òthe United StatesÉtake
steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or Communist
subversionÉ[because to do so] was to protect the security of the United States
– it was to protect freedom itself.Ó[15] Even with the support of the American
populace behind them – in and of itself a feat of significant importance
– Washington was forced to adopt a posture that achieved regional
security with the most marginal risks of provoking the Soviet Union to an armed
confrontation. The reality faced
during this period was that ÒAmericaÕs nuclear superiority was eroding, and its
economic supremacy was being challengedÉVietnam finally signaled that it was
high time to reassess AmericaÕs role in the developing world, and to find some
sustainable ground between abdication and overextension.Ó[16] As US policymakers began to reevaluate
their traditional posture in the Middle East in light of changing circumstances
– one that ceded Israel with an almost exclusive diplomatic edge –
it was not radical to accept that the United States would have to identify and
befriend more than just their lone outpost in Israel if they were to have any
hope of insulating the region against communist advances as well as meet their
own economic and strategic demands from their multi-year standoff with the
Soviet Union. The United States,
as Kissinger suggests, would have to rely more on this new archetype of
calculated friendship than simple and stubborn commitment to succeed in this
region of the world.
Vietnam, and the
setbacks US forces had suffered there, had exposed the fatal flaw in thinking
that the United States could simply resign itself to overwhelming its enemies
with massive industrial production and exhaustive military resources. American efforts against Communism
across the globe had reached a pivotal crossroads. US policymakers by the beginning of the 1970s began to
accept that victory could only be achieved by sustaining an intricate network
of alliances and friendships that would achieve desired ends, such as containing
Communism and furthering American interests abroad, without requiring a
military commitment of US forces that the countryÕs people would not tolerate
and that the country itself could no longer meet. The greatest fear in the Middle East, as Nixon himself
articulated, was that Ò[t]he potential for a
confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. loomed large. If the Soviets were committed to Arab
victories, and we were committed to Israeli victories, it did not require much
imagination to see how we both might be drawn in even against our wills –
and almost certainly against our national interests.Ó[17] This confrontation with Moscow was an
eventuality that American policymakers went to great lengths to avoid through
the adoption of a policy that would endear friendships rather than cause
diplomatic rifts and tension in the region.
In order
to strengthen the US position outside of the borders of Israel, inroads to the
Arab community were undoubtedly necessary. As the Middle East was budding with newly independent
states, however, the impetus to forge alliances, even on the most superficial
or rudimentary terms, was powerful as it would render the entire region far
less susceptible to Soviet influence.
The simple reality of the region was that Ò[a]fter World War II the nations of the Middle
East moved rapidly from political dependence to independence, and the formerly
subsidized Arab oil states emerged as one of the worldÕs dominant economic
forces.Ó[18] With oil as the lifeblood of industrial
armies and advanced societies, ceding the vast oil capacities of the Middle
East to Communism was not a matter that could be taken lightly in
Washington. Unlike alliances that
could be forged in Western Europe, however, ideology would not serve as a
common link to strengthen a Middle Eastern alliance with the US. With disparate cultural and religious
values, the best that could possibly be expected in Washington was to court an
Arab nation into dealing with the US on an economic basis in the hopes that a
secular relationship might evolve into something more permanent and
lasting. Ò[B]lessed with a quarter
of the worldÕs known oil reserves,Ó[19]
and with domestic security (and thus the securing of military munitions and
technology) as a primary concern of its leaders,[20] Saudi Arabia was perhaps the most promising of Middle
Eastern regimes to an American courtship.
While ideologically juxtaposed to the US and comprised of a population
that Òshared the deep distrust and hatred of Israel exhibited by King Ibn Saud,
the founder of the dynasty,Ó[21]
the government in power there was willing to deal with American leaders so long
as the relationship remained aligned with their own self-interest. It was for this reason that Saudi
Arabia would be termed a Òmoderate Arab stateÓ[22] and that Saudi Arabia would quickly become ÒAmericaÕs most
important clientÓ[23]
in the US efforts to contain Communism in the Middle East.
The relationship between the US
and Saudi Arabia emerged as the counterpoint of its traditional alliance with
Israel. The relationship between
Washington and Riyadh more resembled a business merger than a political
alliance, but it was a first step in an important direction – a direction
that could lead to peace and security throughout the entire region. Insofar as Saudi oil was concerned, Ò[a] growing number of knowledgeable individuals in the
United States had realized the need to assure access to foreign oil to
supplement the declining domestic reserves.Ó[24] Saudi Arabia was thus a nation in a
unique position to supplement US oil needs. As one historian noted: ÒSaudi ArabiaÕs importance
[stemmed] not only from the fact that [it was] the single largest supplier to
oil markets but also from its ability to serve as the Ôswing producer,Õ as the
producer of last resort. The
Kingdom [could] fill this role because it maintain[ed]É[a high] idle capacity,
meaning capacity above and beyond its daily production needs. This capacity [could] be brought on to
substitute for the loss of any other production on the world markets.[25]
To secure access to
these unparalleled production capacities in Saudi Arabia, US leaders could
secure the stability of their own oil needs while simultaneously denying the
Soviet Union access to this strategic asset – a significant move in the
intricate ÒchessÓ of realpolitik.
Since Ò[d]izzying oil
wealth would necessarily bring predators that Saudi ArabiaÕs population of five
million could not single-handedly defend against,Ó[26]
the prospect of gleaning from AmericaÕs vast military stores to further their
own security was a tempting one for Saudi leaders – prompting them to
weigh the resentment of America permeating their society against their ability
to preserve and protect their own status and power. Washington, hopeful that Ò[s]izable
arms sales would bolster the American balance of payments position and could
well serve to keep it from falling into a deficit position,Ó[27]
were more than willing to begin selling arms to an eager Saudi government in
exchange for access to the countryÕs vast oil fields and production
capacities. If there was concern
among US policymakers that arming Saudi Arabia posed a significant threat to
Israeli national security, it was short-lived. After crushing an attempted coup of the country by Òradical
nationalist[s]Ó[28] in 1969,
Saudi leaders were extremely vocal in their interest to secure arms to protect
themselves rather than molest Jewish settlements in Israel.[29] As Saudi Minister Muhammed Abdel
Yamani stated, ÒÔWe are a very appealing piece of cakeÉIn our dealing with the
industrialized world, we must cultivate friends who will look after our
interests and protect us.ÕÓ[30] Though much of Saudi Arabia was
decidedly set against Israeli interests in the region, its leaders adopted a
more pragmatic mindset that prioritized their own stability above any
ideological problems with Israel.
It was in this atmosphere of strategic exchange that a relationship,
albeit a tenuous and complicated one, began to develop between the two
countries. [31]
As the relationship
between the United States and Saudi Arabia developed, the delicate balance of
US relations to Israel became readily apparent. 
The common perception in Saudi
Arabia, and throughout the Arab Middle East was that Òthe
Jewish state [in Israel] was an alien presence injected into traditionally Arab
lands on the basis of a 2,000-year-old claim and to expiate the JewsÕ
suffering, which the Arab people had not caused.Ó[32] As a by-product of this perception, consistent
US support for Israel, and more importantly IsraelÕs military, was perceived
throughout Saudi Arabia as a Òmajor affront to its [national] dignity.Ó[33] The delicacy
of the situation rested on the reality that even as US military aid to the
Saudis began, it could only purchase a certain amount of goodwill from a
country ill-suited to tolerate any threat to its own well-being from
Israel. As US aid continued to
bolster IsraelÕs armed forces, the realities of a regime forced to balance its
security concerns with its traditional position of leadership within the Arab
community became evident. As one
American diplomat to Saudi Arabia recalled, ÒInevitably, religion [was]
prominent among the factorsÉthat complicate[d] the US-Saudi security
partnership. Saudi Arabia, as the
home of Islam, [bore] special responsibilities in a Muslim world often beset by
fear and suspicion of too close involvement with the ÒinfidelÓ West. Saudi leaders face[d] the difficult
dilemma of working effectively with the United StatesÉto ensure the countryÕs
security while at the same time maintaining credibility as an independent
custodian of IslamÕs holy places.Ó[34]
With the failed,
radical coup of 1969 fresh in their minds and ever-cognizant of their cultural
position in the Islamic/Arab world, Saudi Arabia proved a challenging
diplomatic partner of the United States, but as an influential Òpower broker in the Middle East,Ó[35] Saudi Arabia was a moderating voice in
the Arab world that the United States could ill-afford to lose. The Saudi regime was indeed constrained
by a necessity to remain close to fellow Arab states in times of crisis in
order to retain the support of its people. [36] But this was viewed by the leadership in
Washington as something to be understood and overcome through a systematic
easing of tension between Arab nations and Israel. The challenge of the 1970s was locating and holding fast to
that singular point wherein traditional commitments to Israel could be
maintained while not alienating the newly-opened dialogue the United States
needed with one of the regionÕs most prominent Arab states. As Kissinger remembered, Òthe world was
divided between friends and antagonists; between arenas for cooperation and
those in which interests clashedÉ[It was accepted that] peace and harmony were
not the natural order of things but temporary oases in a perilous world where
stability could only be preserved by vigilant effort.Ó[37] It is this unique mixture of realpolitikÕs pragmatic assessment and dŽtenteÕs collaborative diplomacy
that American policymakers approached the evolving situation in the Middle East
throughout the 1970s.
The first, monolithic
challenge opposing American diplomats in their efforts to secure goodwill
throughout the Middle East was a legacy of the previous decade: the humiliating
and devastating defeat of an Arab coalition at the hands of the Israeli air
force in 1967. In what history
texts remember as the Six Day War, the Israeli military delivered a crushing
blow to the Arab national pride by annihilating their war capacities and occupying
significant swaths of their territories. The resulting aftermath of the confrontation became a
significant point of contention in both Israel and the Arab community. The Arab communityÕs political stance regarding
IsraelÕs gains in the Six Day War was a far-reaching one: Òa complete Israeli withdrawal from all lands occupied in
the 1967 war andÉ[IsraelÕs] agreement to self-determination by the Palestinian
people, including establishment of an independent Arab Palestine state and the
return and compensation of Arabs who had left Palestine upon the independence
of Israel in 1948.Ó[38] Seeking to return the region to the
status quo of pre-1967, the Arab community clamored vigorously for concessions
that a victorious and perhaps overly-proud Israeli government was unwilling to
grant. To the average citizen in
Israel, however, the newly acquired defensive positions along the Golan Heights
and the Suez Canal granted them unprecedented levels of security from their
aggressive Arab neighbors – security they were reluctant to give up. As noted, Ò[A]nyone who climbs the
Golan Heights and looks down on the Israeli settlements below would tend to
think it preferable to hold on to them, rather than giving them up in exchange
for peace.Ó[39] The greatest obstacle to Middle East
peace, as a result of this 1967 legacy, was the simple fact that the Israeli
people were unwilling to negotiate with a people they had so thoroughly
conquered. As Richard Nixon
noted: ÒI was impressed by
the courage and toughness of the Israeli leaders and people. But I was disturbed by the fact that
their swift and overwhelming victory over the Arabs had created a feeling of
overconfidenceÉand an attitude of total intransigence on negotiating any peace
agreementÉTheir victory had been too great. It left a residue of hatred among their neighbors that I
felt could only result in another war, particularly if the Russians were to
step up military aid to their defeated Arab clients.Ó[40]
With
unwilling politicians in Israel stalling the process of peace in the region,
the discontent among Arab nations, Saudi Arabia among them, began to
intensify. It was in this context that
American leaders suddenly found their opposing foreign policies sorely tested
as the United States found itself in an undesirable position – one that
necessitated substantial military and economic aid to Israel (to the chagrin
and dismay of neighboring Arab states) in the larger hope of preventing the
entire Middle East from falling victim to an ever-expanding radicalism and
fundamentalism in the Arab community and broader threat from Soviet
Communism. The invasion of Jordan
by various Arab factions in 1970 was the catalyst for previously unprecedented
US involvement in the region and, thus, put American interests in Israel and Saudi
Arabia squarely at odds. 
As a ÒSyrian armored brigade crossed the border into
northwestern Jordan,Ó[41]
it was evident that the more radical or anti-Western Arab states enjoyed Soviet
military support and that the United States was obligated to take decisive
action to keep the situation from spiraling out of control. To increase the precariousness of the
situation, the invasion of Jordan prompted a series of military strikes by
Israeli forces – unwilling to simply watch opposition forces advance unchecked
so close their borders. The more
involved Israel became, however, the more frequent the Israeli militaryÕs
Òroutine retaliationÓ[42]
against Arab forces – events not well-received by Saudi Arabia. With each passing day Israel
intensified its military efforts against what it perceived as a growing threat
in Jordan and, with each day, further complicated the diplomatic task of
American policymakers. ÒIsraeli
jets,Ó noted one New York Times article, Òcontinued the intensified series of bombing raids
they launched against Egyptian positions along the canal 15 days ago when
Egyptian commandos ambushed Israeli patrols, killing 14 soldiers, wounding two
and capturing two.Ó[43] With the events of 1967 still raw in
their collective memory, the idea that Israeli planes once again roamed the
skies of Arab nations was, to say the least, not well-received. Recalling his thoughts on the crisis,
Nixon rationalized American support of Israel as necessary when examining the
broader context of the crisis: Ò[O]ne thing was clear. We could not allow Hussein to be
overthrown by a Soviet-inspired insurrectionÉthe Israelis would almost
certainly take pre-emptive measures against a Syrian-dominated radical
government in Jordan; the Egyptians were tied to Syria by military alliances;
and Soviet prestige was on the line with both the Syrians and Egyptians. Since the United States could not stand
idly by and watch Israel being driven into the sea, the possibility of a direct
US-Soviet confrontation was uncomfortably high. It was like a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war
waiting at the end.Ó[44]
With the
military intervention of Israeli forces, US policymakers were forced to find a
way to successfully diffuse the situation in such a way that ensured peace
while simultaneously assuring that no party to the conflict felt slighted or
vulnerable as to lead to yet another violent confrontation—no small
task. As one newspaper recalled, ÒThe death, destruction and
suffering in Jordan last week are viewed in Cairo as an inevitable result of
the overall Arab need to end the deadlocked conflict with Israel.Ó[45]
The most vexing issue to American
policymakers was to pressure a reluctant Israeli government to concede to at
least a portion of the Arab communityÕs demands and pacify the growing
uneasiness throughout the region before it was too late. As time passed through the early 1970s,
though, even more moderate states such as Saudi Arabia began to adopt a more
critical view of the situation in the face of a troublingly silent Israel. When in
January of 1973 ÒKing Faisal publicly calledÉfor an Arab holy war against
Israel,Ó[46] it was
clear that the situation in the Middle East was reaching a boiling point. Although American leaders dismissed the
anti-Israeli messages flooding from the political forums in Saudi Arabia as Òlargely
intended for internal and inter-Arab consumption,Ó[47]
it was clear that unless there was some form of diplomatic intervention between
the two camps, US interests in safeguarding Israel and befriending Saudi Arabia
(and thus a key element of the Arab community) would be rendered incompatible
as popular pressure forced even the more neutral Arab states to bow to the
passions of the moment for survival.
Having narrowly
averted a serious crisis in Jordan, regional tensions reached a climax in 1973
with the beginning of the Yom Kippur War – a committed attempt by Arab
forces to land a telling blow on their hated rivals in Israel and take by force
what they could not obtain through peaceful diplomacy. Although the initial days of the
conflict saw Israeli forces falling back in defeat, the United States quickly
moved to stabilize the situation.
As Bronson recounts: ÒAs the
Arab front [energized with renewed Soviet support] stood poised to again break
through Israeli defenses, the United States began its own massive airlift to
Israel. By October 13, when the
airlift became fully operational, Washington was delivering one thousand tons
of equipment a day, with flights landing almost every hour. Kissinger [wished for Arab states to]
fully understand that working with the United States brought benefits far in
excess of what the Soviets could provide.[48]
The massive
intervention of the United States on the behalf of Israel was, however,
tempered with an appreciation for the broader scope of American interests in
the region. Domestic pressure and
its traditional alliance with Israel mandated that the United States take
decisive action against Israel being defeated.[49] This support
was not, however, sufficient justification in Washington to alienate the Saudis
and the rest of the Arab nations.
Pragmatically, by being Òtoo enthusiastic in its support for
Israel [US policymakers realized that] whatever leverage America had with the
Arab states would disappear.Ó[50] In order to successfully barter a peace
agreement in the aftermath of the conflict, American leaders knew that a
resurgent Israeli military could not be allowed to repeat its triumph in 1967
– as further humiliation of Arab nations would only lead to a perpetuation
of the resentment and hatred that had fueled the current situation.[51] Nixon himself noted the importance of a restrained Israeli
military when noted, ÒI believed that only a battlefield stalemate would
provide the foundation on which fruitful negotiations might begin. Any equilibrium – even if only an
equilibrium of mutual exhaustion – would make it easier to reach an
enforceable settlement.Ó[52]
Though
unprecedented American aid undoubtedly allowed Israel to take the offensive and
push back the invading Arab forces,[53] it was
the harsh political pressure applied on Israeli leaders by the US that brought
the conflict to an end before Israel could annihilate the encircled Egyptian 3rd
Army and assail the already fragile cultural dignity of the Arab people.[54] With the fighting subsided, American
policymakers were now forced to face the consequences of their diplomatic
entanglements in the Middle East.
The political fallout of the Yom Kippur War placed US policies in the
Middle East to a critical light as American actions gave some credence to past
criticisms of Soviet officials that had bitterly criticized AmericaÕs seemingly
divergent dealings in the region as nothing more than Òa search for a peace
settlementÉ[while supplying] military aid to the aggression.Ó[55] The Arab reaction to a victory-swollen
Israel and her allies was a harsh one as calls for negotiations and diplomatic
talks went largely ignored. Even
worse for American leaders was the breakdown of relations with the moderate
regime in Saudi Arabia. Its
tendency to forego the secular partnership with the US to support the Arab
position their Islamic brothers was at no time more apparent than in its
decision to utilize its greatest economic asset, oil, as a political tool to
pressure the US to bringing Israel to the bargaining table. In order to walk the razorÕs edge in a
diplomatic situation that teetered on the brink of disaster, United StatesÕ
officials were forced to confront the reality that though they thought that
they could have done Òno less for Israel,Ó[56]
during the fighting, their support of Israel in 1973 had come with a
price. With the fighting over, it
quickly became clear that unless American policymakers were willing to be
equitable and extend to the Arab community, especially Saudi Arabia,
significant aid and political effort to restore the region to its previous
balance point, they would lose all they had gained.
The Arab sentiment in
the wake of their defeat in 1973 was a passionate and determined appeal to the
pre-1967 status quo and, unlike previous attempts at negotiations, states such
as Saudi Arabia now were determined to force the American leadership to
successfully address their demands.
Further spurred by an American veto of a UN
Resolution condemning ÒIsraelÕs policies toward PalestineÉ[and] calling for it
to evacuate the territories occupied during the 1967 war,Ó[57]
it became apparent that Òthe time for a
bilateral understandingÉ[had] clearly passed.Ó[58] Saudi Arabia quickly transformed their
harsh, vocal criticisms of US and Israeli policy into action as they laid out
their plans to implementing a comprehensive ban on oil exports to the United States[59]
for as Òlong as Washington refused to yield to Saudi requests on the Israeli
issue [and pull back on its aggressive military and economic aid to the
country].Ó[60] The economic ramifications of this
Saudi Òoil weaponÓ[61] were immediately appreciable in the United States and, as
a result, gained the full attention of WashingtonÕs politicians. As President Nixon and Secretary of
State Kissinger began the arduous task of repositioning American interests to a
point of equilibrium between their Israeli and Saudi interests, it was clear
that a fresh perspective was being utilized in Washington. As Nixon stated, ÒWe are not pro-Israel
and we are not pro-Arab, and we are not any more pro-Arab because they have oil
and Israel hasnÕt. We are
pro-peace and it is in the interest of the whole area for us to
getÉnegotiations off dead center.Ó[62] In this complex game of Cold War chess,
the strategic benefits of a region at peace were obvious and it was toward this
end that the Nixon administration moved toward after 1973.
In the shrewdest form of strategic
diplomacy, Nixon and Kissinger utilized this moment of American weakness to set
upon a strategy that, if successful, would be an unparalleled success. As declassified government documents
confirm, ÒSaudi Arabia [had] become a leader in the Arab World at the expense
of the radical, pro-Soviet states [by their implementation of an oil
embargo]. If the Arabs succeeded
in achieving some of their goals regarding Israel, more credit [would] go to
Saudi oil than to Soviet arms.Ó[63] Though the Saudi oil embargo was
obviously not an event the US had desired it was, in fact, an event that US policymakers
realized could greatly benefit their diplomatic efforts in the region. By responding to Saudi demands for
negotiations and concessions from Israel, the United States could (1) further
insulate the region from Communism by demonstrating that Arab states possessed
the necessary clout to redress their own grievances without Soviet assistance,
(2) raise the already significant status of Saudi Arabia in the Middle Eastern
community by allowing them a success for the larger Arab cause and (3) regain
the political and economic friendship of the Saudi government. With this insight, however, came the
reality that the United States first had to find a way to respond to Saudi
demands without alienating the domestic pro-Israel lobby in the US as well as the
traditional ties to the Israeli people.
The most delicate step in
negotiating with the various parties of the region in the wake of the Yom
Kippur War was that US policymakers were forced to find a way to reassure all
parties to the talks of their own benevolent intentions towards peace and
simultaneously create an atmosphere of cooperation within the region without
the slightest hint of impropriety.
The policy was as unique as it was effective. As Lenore Martin noted, ÒAfter the 1973 War, Kissinger
engaged in shuttle diplomacy to negotiate ceasefires with all of IsraelÕs
neighbors and promoted the Geneva Peace Conference that started in December
1973.Ó[64] Kissinger was consistently open in his
efforts to ease tensions throughout the region and this genuineness lent a
great deal of momentum to the peace process. As historian William Quandt noted, ÒKissinger
felt previous administrations had erred in viewing their choices as being
pro-Israel or pro-Arab. In his
view it was precisely the special relationship with Israel that obliged the
Arabs to deal with the United States in the diplomatic arena. Power, not sentiment, was what
counted. The difficulty, of
course, was that to keep the Arabs looking toward the United States, the
diplomatic process had to hold out more hope to them than would another round
of war.Ó[65]
By seeking to remain
an interested but ultimately neutral force in the negotiations, Kissinger
demonstrated a willingness within the US to stray from their traditional
diplomatic position —a position that had consistently placed Israeli
needs above other regional interests —and adopt a more broad-based and
balanced regional policy. This
task of realignment, however, was not a seamless transition. Israel, above all, was hesitant to
accept US efforts to elicit concessions from them to the Arab community as in
their best interest. To a nation
who had experienced a significant level of animosity from its neighbors since
its founding, the idea of giving back land that many Israelis passionately believed
contributed to their safety and survival was not an appealing one. As Kissinger himself noted, ÒAny shift in foreign policy [encountered] stiff resistance
from adherents to the previous course; every successful negotiation [ran] the
gauntlet of those who [denied] that an agreement generally reflects reciprocal
concessions rather than unilateral satisfactions.Ó[66] American policy, as Kissinger suggests,
encountered resistance from Israel because it was, for the first time,
demanding that Israel utilize negotiation rather than entrenched defenses to
achieve its security.
After significant
diplomatic effort, Kissinger successfully negotiated a disarming of the Suez
Canal region between Israel and Egypt and began to see his hopes at regional
cooperation come to fruition – much to the applause of the Saudis.[67] When, as Benson Lee Gryson recounts,
Òthe disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights had
finally been crowned with success, Saudi Interior Minister Prince FahdÉsigned
well-publicized agreements providing for the establishment of two [cooperative]
commissions [with the United States].Ó[68] Encouraged by this first step toward
peace and having achieved a substantial success to boast to the Arab community,
the Saudi government announced that it would ease its oil restrictions to the
US in exchange for further diplomatic efforts.
[69] In response, Kissinger
began a similar effort to ease military build-ups along the Israeli-Syrian
border of the Golan Heights as a further demonstration of AmericaÕs commitment
to peace and cooperation in the region.[70] Having identified the extremely
positive Saudi response to KissingerÕs diplomatic efforts and successfully
reopened economic channels to the Saudi nation, a new priority seemed to arise
in AmericaÕs foreign policy – to go to great lengths to maintain parity
between their relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
US policy
during the middle years of the 1970s demonstrated a high priority on inducing
continued efforts toward peace by firmly addressing any perceived national
weakness on the part of Saudi Arabia or Israel with committed American aid and
effort. In order to assuage Saudi
concerns surrounding IsraelÕs heightened state of military preparedness, US
policymakers placed a high priority on negotiating a de-militarization along
key positions of the Israeli border and supplying the Saudi military with
Òsophisticated weapon systemsÓ[71]
that neutralized many of IsraelÕs tactical advantages. As Òtanks, fighters, frigates,
minesweepers and HAWK [Surface-to-Air]ÉmissilesÓ[72]
began to flood into the Saudi arsenal, the well-rooted fear of IsraelÕs air
command began to diminish and, with it, also diminished the fear that peace
with Israel was unattainable.
In order to
counter-balance American aid to Saudi Arabia, the US acknowledged IsraelÕs
repeated concerns Òabout
the huge weapons flows pouring into the Persian Gulf regionÓ[73]
and took decisive steps to assure them of their safety. The subsequent explosion of economic
and military aid to Israel effectively offset the concern that accompanied the
influx of arms to Saudi Arabia – even the proposed sale of 60 F-15
long-range fighter aircraft in 1977.[74] Total economic and military aid to
Israel rose dramatically in the beginning of the 1970s from $71.1 million in
1970 to $2.57 billion only four years later.[75] Corresponding with this significant
increase in Israeli aid, the US offset this aid with a similarly powerful
commitment to Saudi Arabia. In
1971 US arms sales amounted to approximately $15 million and, as aid to Israel
blossomed in 1975, Saudi arms purchases exceeded $2.5 billion in 1976.[76]
By supplying Israel
and Saudi Arabia with the necessary components to achieve a measure of security
and national confidence short of an armed confrontation with the other and
Ò[p]romoting measures to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, Washington used this
policy in the Cold War years to improve AmericaÕs imageÉand to limit Soviet
influence in the Middle East.Ó[77] The results of later 1970s policy in
the Middle East was marked with delicately balanced success. Military barriers that had held the
region in a constant, passively hostile state of unease and vigilance were
beginning to erode. The one
unparalleled military advantage of IsraelÕs air force, which had been so
instrumental in its victories in 1967 and 1973, was now held in check by a
comprehensive, accurate air defense system that had originated in the United
States.[78] Most importantly, however, was the
successful effort by American policymakers, such as Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger, to usher in this era of peace while maintaining a high degree of
objectivity and equilibrium in their dealings with the regionÕs various member
states. By resisting the temptation
to favor one nation over the other, the United States was in a most favorable
position to Ò[take] charge of the peace processÓ [79]
and capitalize on the rapidly eroding Òstalemate [that] had brought some key
Arab leaders toÉturn to the United States [for leadership and guidance in the
first place].Ó[80]
Despite
the rejuvenated relationship the United States was enjoying with the Saudi
Kingdom, the secular nature of the two nationsÕ partnership was at no times
more apparent than after EgyptÕs Anwar Sadat made a series of unannounced trips
in the hopes of formalizing a peace accord with Israel. [81] After SadatÕs visit to Israel in 1977,
Òthe Saudis were placed in a difficult positionÉThey had no advance warning of
SadatÕs sudden move, were surprised and more than a little disturbed by it, and
sought to avoid having to take sides between Egypt and the radical Arab
states.Ó[82] Newly anointed American leader
Jimmy Carter, a firm practitioner in the cool evaluation and pragmatic thinking
of Nixon-like realpolitik, possessed a highly charismatic nature.[83] Carter, by this framework, viewed
SadatÕs outreach as a chance for him to significantly further US interests in
Israel; as a chance he could not let slip away – even with the abstention
of Saudi Arabia from the proceedings.[84] The key to CarterÕs success in opening
a dialogue with Sadat and IsraelÕs Menachem Begin was to proceed in such a way
that would allow Saudi Arabia to remain a respectable distance from the
process; to allow his efforts with Sadat to further perceptions of Saudi
security even absent of an open declaration of support from King Faisal
himself. [85] The one point that Carter was most
assuredly aware of as he began the peace talks was that he could not
demonstrate a partiality to the Israeli delegation that would necessitate the
kind of direct opposition from Saudi Arabia that had occurred in 1973. As the New York Times had reported, Ò[Saudi
leaders] made it clear that even though [they] had what amounted to a fanatical
hatred of Zionism, [they] would support American moves for an equitable agreement
because calm and stability were needed for Saudi society to prosper.Ó[86] Cognizant of the imperative of
preserving American interests by maintaining regional equilibrium, Carter approached
SadatÕs olive branch with a focus and energy that would settle for nothing less
than a meaningful and appreciable success toward regional peace; a peace that
would be realized through the Camp David Accords.
From the beginning of
the negotiations Carter quickly dispelled any notion that the United States
would tolerate hesitancy on the part of IsraelÕs Menachem Begin to the end the
many years of conflict with the Arab nations of the region. When negotiations at Camp David seemed to stall Carter was
not indirect when he Òtold Begin that a restive congress and public opinion
would be unwilling to continue to supply Israel with $1 billion a year in
military credits and almost that much in economic assistance unless Ôsome light
[could] be seen at the end of the tunnel.Ó[87] In order to expedite the process of
securing Israeli support of a peace initiative, Carter even went so far as to
offer significant amounts of US assistance to assure BeginÕs compliance with
the treatyÕs stipulations.[88] As Schulzinger detailed, ÒIn the midst
of a windstorm, the president guaranteed a pact committing Israel to withdraw
from the Sinai in return for peace and diplomatic recognition from Egypt. The United States promised $2 billion
to underwrite the cost of moving IsraelÕs advanced airfield from the Sinai to
Israel proper.Ó[89] CarterÕs
position at Camp David demonstrates the US commitment to attaining security for
the Israeli people in a way that preserved the pride of all nations whom the
United States viewed as integral to their desired regional alliances. Though obviously seeking to further
reinforce American efforts to contain Communism, Carter made a point to do so
in such a way that made it clear to the Israeli government that such an
alliance between the United States and the Arab world was built on the
framework that extended them distinct and meaningful benefits. President Carter made consistent
pledges that ÒAmerican support Ôfor the security and well-being of Israel [was]
firm and unshakableÕÓ[90]
and that such support would continue forever.[91] It is clear that such rhetoric
was intended to assure the Israeli people that in the throes of these
negotiations, the United States had not forgotten its promises to protect and
maintain the still-dependent Jewish state even while they extended a hand of
friendship to nations that Israel had once fought bitter and bloody wars
against; even while it continued its controversial sale of advanced aircraft
and other military equipment to the Saudi government.[92]
Though the Saudi
Arabian government ultimately abstained at Camp David, it was in no way an
indication that the efforts of Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, etc. were wasted upon
them. As discussed previously, the
Saudi government was forced to accept the reality that its public policy was
many times dictated by the overwhelming resentment by the average Saudi citizen
towards American interests. The
most obvious case of this paradigm was the Saudi leader through the tumultuous
times in the 1970s: King Faisal.
As an Arab leader with an increasingly pro-American sentiment, FaisalÕs
sudden assassination effectively stifled the sentiments he had expressed to
Nixon earlier that, ÒAnyone who stands against you, Mr. President, in the
United States of America or outsideÉstands against usÉTherefore, we beseech
Almighty God to lend His help to us and to you so that we can both go hand in
hand, shoulder to shoulder in pursuance of the noble aims that we both share,
namely those of peace, justice and prosperity in the world.[93]
The measure of American success in
Saudi Arabia was evident in its ability to court the friendship of a nation,
for the most part, ideologically opposed to their presence in the region. Even though the US-Saudi relationship
was one rooted, primarily, in mutual material benefit, the sustaining of such a
complex and demanding relationship was an accomplishment that should not be
underestimated. The friction that
arose throughout the 1970s was a result of American policymakersÕ unfamiliarity
with such a delicate task as balancing the dynamic, opposing interests of
Israel and Saudi Arabia. It was,
however, a delicate task that American policymakers deemed necessary in light
of the context of their lives. The
realities of the Cold War necessitated that allies be located beyond IsraelÕs
borders – allies that would not possess the ideological make-up that had
solidified the bonds between the US and Israel. In this great chess game of diplomatic pragmatism, the
American goal of containing Communism necessitated that friendship on even the
most fragile of grounds be sought in the larger hope of prevailing against the
Soviet Union.
Despite the reality that certain
allies in the Cold War were enticed by American industrial and economic might,
such as Saudi Arabia, they were deemed desirable by the likes of Nixon and
Carter because their presence reduced the likelihood of a direct military
commitment into the Middle East that the United States could no longer
afford. With supporting Israel as
the ideological and moral imperative that many citizens within the US would
support, the US aggressively sought to court key Arab states, such as Saudi
Arabia, away from the dangerous allure of Soviet aid through a systematic
effort to de-escalate tensions in the region. By successfully alleviating the volatile pressures that made
the promise of Soviet weapons and money so tempting to the Arab world, American
policymakers ushered a new era of peace wherein the Middle Eastern states could
obtain what they desired through close cooperation and patience with the US
rather than with force. This is
the measure of success for American foreign policy during the 1970s.
By successfully balancing a web of
competing interests that, at times, teetered on the narrow edge of disaster,
the United States left its mark on the people of the region and, by the end of
the decade, had assured that Communism would not find a tenable foothold in the
region. The economic and political
benefits received by the US as a result of their partnerships with Israel and
Saudi Arabia propelled American society past the failings of Vietnam and look
with confidence to the days that lay ahead. Although the reception of American presence in the region
during this decade was mixed at best, there can be no doubt that the steps
taken during this period had significant effect on the region as a whole. From the sale of Òairborne warning and
control systems (AWACs) and F-15 fighters with extended fuel capacity,Ó[94]
in the early 1980s through the present day, the legacy of AmericaÕs desire to
retain an ally in Israel and forge a firm-bound relationship with the Arab
world through Saudi Arabia can be seen resonating to the present day in a
balancing act of competing interests that may never end.
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